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The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Momenta v. Amphastar highlights the continuing
uncertainty regarding the scope of the statutory exemption from patent infringement provided in 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). The statute states that “[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer
to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological
products.” Since its adoption in 1984 with the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, however, the
precise meaning of the statute has been the subject of considerable debate, triggering two U.S.
Supreme Court decisions and multiple decisions of the Federal Circuit and various U.S. district
courts. Judicial interpretations of key terms of § 271(e)(1), based on a textual analysis of the statute,
the structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the legislative history of the Act, have resulted in
conflicting views as to the scope and applicability of the statute. This Article provides a working
interpretation of the meaning of the statute, based on currently controlling case law.

Copyright © 2013 The John Marshall Law School

Cite as Alfred C. Server, Application of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s Safe Harbor Provision
Following Momenta, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2013).

APPLICATION OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT’S SAFE HARBOR PROVISION
FOLLOWING MOMENTA
ALFRED C. SERVER
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 2
I. ENACTMENT OF 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) ............................................................................ 3
A. Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. .............................................. 3
B. The Statutory Safe Harbor Provision .................................................................. 5
1. The Hatch-Waxman Act and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) ..................................... 5
2. Legislative History of the Act........................................................................ 6
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAFE HARBOR STATUTE—35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1)...................................................................................................................... 9
A. Overview ................................................................................................................ 9
B. Critical Terms...................................................................................................... 10
1. Under a Federal Law ................................................................................... 10
2. Solely............................................................................................................. 15
3. Reasonably Related...................................................................................... 20
4. Patented Invention ...................................................................................... 26
5. Submission Of Information ......................................................................... 42
a. Background ......................................................................................... 42
b. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC .............................. 43
c. Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ......................................................................... 47
d. Summation .......................................................................................... 63
III. APPLICATION OF THE SAFE HARBOR STATUTE ........................................................... 64
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 67

1

[13:1 2013]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

2

APPLICATION OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT’S SAFE HARBOR PROVISION
FOLLOWING MOMENTA
ALFRED C. SERVER*
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc. highlights the continuing uncertainty regarding
the scope of the statutory exemption from patent infringement provided in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1), the so-called safe harbor statute.1 The statute states that:
[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. 2
Since its adoption in 1984 with the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, however,
the precise meaning of the statute has been the subject of considerable debate,
triggering two U.S. Supreme Court decisions and multiple decisions of the Federal
Circuit and various U.S. district courts. 3 Judicial interpretations of key terms of
§ 271(e)(1), based on a textual analysis of the statute, the structure of the HatchWaxman Act and the legislative history of the Act, have resulted in conflicting views
as to the scope and applicability of the statute.4
This Article provides a working interpretation of the meaning of the safe harbor
statute, based on currently controlling case law. Part I begins with a brief review of
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,
which prompted the proposal for the section of the Hatch-Waxman Act that added
§ 271(e)(1) to the federal patent laws. 5 It next discusses the structure and pertinent
legislative history of the Act. Part II reviews judicial interpretations of the statutory
terms “under a Federal law,” “solely,” “reasonably related,” “patented invention,” and
“submission of information.” In the course of the review, the tension among the
Federal Circuit’s recent decisions in Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.,6

* © Alfred C. Server 2013. Affiliated Scholar, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1994; M.D., Stanford University School of Medicine, 1977; Ph.D.
(Neurosciences), Stanford University, 1976; A.B., Princeton University, 1970.
1 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
2 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012); Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1354.
3 See generally Suneel Arora et al., Medical Device Law: The Interplay Between FDA and
Patent Law: Infusing Organizational Knowledge for Medical Device Companies, 39 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1176, 1196-201 (2013).
4 See infra Part II.
5 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863–64 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
6 Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 7 and Momenta is addressed.
Specifically, these arguably conflicting holdings have created uncertainty regarding
the applicability of the statutory exemption provided under § 271(e)(1) to certain
types of patented inventions, such as research tools and manufacturing test methods,
and to activities undertaken following the marketing approval of a product.
Although some of the tension among these Federal Circuit decisions may have been
resolved if the Supreme Court had granted the writ of certiorari in the Momenta
case, its refusal to hear the case8 has left this legal arena in a state of uncertainty.
In the absence of a definitive statement from the Supreme Court, a party who
intends to use a patented invention without authorization in reliance on the
protection afforded by the safe harbor statute may have to accept some risk of
infringement liability. Part III provides an analytical approach to the application of
the statutory exemption to the unauthorized use of a patented invention, based on
currently controlling case law.
I. ENACTMENT OF 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
A. Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals
Co. 9 prompted the proposal for § 202 of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which added 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), the safe harbor statute, to the federal patent laws.10 The court
addressed the question of whether a generic drug manufacturer could use a
pharmaceutical company’s patented drug during the patent’s term to prepare
required regulatory submissions for the United States Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) for the purpose of marketing its own generic version of the drug upon patent
expiration.11 Roche, the pharmaceutical company, claimed that the unauthorized use
of its patented drug prior to the expiration of the patent constituted patent
infringement.12 Bolar, the generics manufacturer, argued that its intended use was
exempted from infringement liability on two grounds: “the first ground is based on a
liberal interpretation of the traditional experimental use exception; the second
ground is that public policy favors generic drugs and thus mandates the creation of a
new exception in order to allow FDA required drug testing.”13 The Federal Circuit
held that Bolar’s intended use was indeed patent infringement, and rejected each of
the manufacturer’s grounds for an exception.14

7
8

(2013).

Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
See Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854, 2854

Roche, 733 F.2d at 863–64.
See infra Part I.B.1; Arora et al., supra note 3, at 1196.
11 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
12 Id. at 860.
13 Id. at 862.
14 Id. at 863.
9

10
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With respect to the “so-called experimental use defense to liability for
infringement,” 15 the Federal Circuit concluded that Bolar’s concession that its
intended use of Roche’s patented drug “does not fall within the ‘traditional limits’ of
the experimental use exception”16 was fatal. In the words of the court,
[d]espite Bolar’s argument that its tests are “true scientific inquiries” to
which a literal interpretation of the experimental use exception logically
should extend, we hold the experimental use exception to be truly narrow,
and we will not expand it under the present circumstances. . . . Bolar’s
intended “experimental” use is solely for business reasons and not for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.
Bolar’s intended use of [the patented drug] to derive FDA required test data
is thus an infringement of the . . . patent. Bolar may intend to perform
“experiments,” but unlicensed experiments conducted with a view to the
adaption of the patented invention to the experimenter’s business is a
violation of the rights of the patentee to exclude others from using his
patented invention. . . . We cannot construe the experimental use rule so
broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of “scientific
inquiry,” when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial
commercial purposes.17
The Federal Circuit then rejected Bolar’s argument that, as a public policy
matter, the court should create a new exception to infringement liability to allow for
FDA-required drug testing.18 As the court explained,
Bolar argues that even if no established doctrine exists with which it can
escape liability for patent infringement, public policy requires that we
create a new exception to the use prohibition. Parties and amici seem to
think, in particular, that we must resolve a conflict between the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–392 (1982), and the
Patent Act of 1952, or at least the Acts’ respective policies and purposes.
We decline the opportunity here, however, to engage in legislative activity
proper only for the Congress. . . . No matter how persuasive the policy
arguments are . . . this court is not the proper forum in which to debate
them. Where Congress has the clear power to enact legislation, our role is
only to interpret and apply that legislation. . . . We will not rewrite the
patent laws here.19

Id. at 862.
Id. at 863.
17 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Alfred C.
Server et al., Reach-Through Rights and the Patentability, Enforcement and Licensing of Patents on
Drug Discovery Tools, 1 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 21, 58–59 (2009) (reviewing case law related to
the common law “experimental use” exception).
18 Roche, 733 F.2d at 863–65.
19 Id.
15
16
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B. The Statutory Safe Harbor Provision
1. The Hatch-Waxman Act and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
The Hatch-Waxman Act, officially named the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,20 was enacted by Congress five months after
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Roche v. Bolar. The Act contained two significant
portions:
Title I—Abbreviated New Drug Applications and Title II—Patent
Extension. 21 Title I of the Act amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(21 U.S.C. § 355)22 in order to establish a generic drug approval procedure for pioneer
drugs approved after 1962. Title II, which amended Title 35 of the U.S.C. (the patent
law), contained two significant sections. Section 201 of Title II added § 156
(Extension of Patent Term) to the federal patent laws, with the goal of extending the
normal term of a patent if a product that is covered by the patent is required by
federal law to undergo regulatory review prior to its commercial marketing. 23
Section 202 amended 35 U.S.C. § 271 (Infringement of Patent) by adding
§ 271(e)(1)—the so-called statutory exemption or safe harbor provision—which reads
as follows:
[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as
those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the
Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant
DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes
involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under
a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or
veterinary biological products.24

20 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act].
21 Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 20, at 1585, 1598. A third portion, Title III—Amendments
to the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act and the Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939, is not
relevant to the issues discussed in this Article. Id. at 1603.
22 Id. at 1585.
23 Id. at 1598.
24 Id. at 1603; 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). Note that as originally enacted, § 271(e)(1) read as
follows:

It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented invention
(other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are
used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913))
solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs.
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Congress had already considered components of what was to become the HatchWaxman Act prior to the Roche v. Bolar decision. The Drug Price Competition Act of
1983, “to allow faster marketing of new generic drugs equivalent to approved new
drugs,” and the Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983, “to add to the patent grant a
period of time equivalent to that lost due to regulatory delay,” were both before
Congress at the time of the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Roche.25 However, the Roche
decision prompted the proposal for section 202 of the Hatch-Waxman Act that added
§ 271(e)(1) to the patent laws.26 The enactment of this safe harbor statute effectively
reversed the Federal Circuit’s holding in the Roche case. Whether the sole purpose
for the inclusion of section 202 in the Act was to reverse the Roche decision (and that
fact sets a limit to the scope of the applicability of § 271(e)(1)) is the subject of active
debate. Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit, in his dissent in Momenta, argued that
“[a] review of [the legislative history] shows that section 202 of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, enacted as § 271(e)(1), had the sole purpose of overruling this court’s holding in
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. In particular, § 271(e)(1) applied
only in limited situations, namely pre-approval experiments to obtain FDA
approval.”27 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, in his Supreme Court opinions in Eli
Lilly and Merck, allowed for a considerably broader role for the statutory exemption
when he stated that “[u]ndoubtedly the decision in Roche promoted the proposal of
[section] 202; but whether that alone accounted for its enactment is quite a different
question.” 28 As will be discussed in Part II of this Article, this debate as to the
purpose of section 202 of the Hatch-Waxman Act, as well as the role of the legislative
history of the Act in discerning that purpose, is at the core of the most significant
disagreements as to the scope and applicability of § 271(e)(1).
2. Legislative History of the Act
Although it has been claimed that “[t]here is a paucity of legislative history on
the Hatch-Waxman Act,”29 “[t]he legislative history of § 271(e)(1) includes more than
[two] House reports, [twenty-five] statements and letters, and many pages of
Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 20, at 1603. The subsequent amendments to § 271(e)(1) that
brought the statute to its current form are not relevant to the issues addressed in this Article, with
the exception of the expansion of the ambit of the safe harbor statute to include most new animal
drugs and veterinary biological products. This change to § 271(e)(1) and the corresponding change
to § 156 have been cited as evidence that the two sections are intended to work in tandem, an
argument that has been used in construing the scope of the safe harbor statute. See infra note 191.
25 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Congress is well
aware of the economic and societal problems which the parties debate here, and has before it
legislation with respect to these issues.”) (citations omitted). See Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, H.R. 3605, 98th Cong. (1984) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)).
26 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670 n.3 (1990) (“Undoubtedly the
decision in Roche promoted the proposal of § 202.”).
27 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Rader, J., dissenting).
28 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 670 n.3 (emphasis added).
29 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug
Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999).
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Congressional testimony.”30 The two House reports—H.R. No. 98-857, Part I, from
the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 31 and H.R. No. 98-857, Part II, from the
Committee on the Judiciary32—are most frequently cited by those judges who are of
the opinion that the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act is relevant in
construing § 271(e)(1).33 While a detailed review of these House reports is beyond the
scope of this Article, a few general statements regarding the reports are warranted.
First, according to the House reports, § 271(e)(1) was intended to overrule the
Federal Circuit’s decision in Roche v. Bolar. 34 Part I of H.R. 98-857 stated the
following in its analysis of section 202 of the proposed Act:
The
purpose
of
Section[] . . . 271(e)(1) . . . is
to
establish
that
experimentation with a patented drug product, when the purpose is to
prepare for commercial activity which will begin after a valid patent
expires, is not a patent infringement. . . . In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held
that the experimental use of a drug product prior to the expiration date of a
patent claiming that drug product constitutes patent infringement, even
though the only purpose of the experiments is to seek FDA approval for the
commercial sale of the drug after the patent expires. It is the Committee’s
view that experimental activity does not have any adverse economic impact
on the patent owner’s exclusivity during the life of a patent, but prevention
of such activity would extend the patent owner’s commercial exclusivity
beyond the patent expiration date.35
Part II of H.R. 98-857 stated that “[t]he provisions of section 202 of the bill have
the net effect of reversing the holding of the court in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co., Inc.”36
Second, the House reports are replete with references to generic products and
the objective of § 271(e)(1) to facilitate the prompt introduction of such products into
the marketplace upon the expiration of the patent claiming the pioneer drug. 37 For
example, Part I of H.R. 98-857 states that “[T]itle II provides that it is not an act of
patent infringement for a generic drug maker to import or to test a patented drug in
preparation for seeking FDA approval if marketing of the drug would occur after
expiration of the patent.”38 Part II of H.R. 98-857 states,
Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting).
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984).
32 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2 (1984).
33 See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 496 F.3d 1334, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader, J., dissenting);
Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1362–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Rader, J., dissenting); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1071 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
34 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45–46; see also Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1362–63 (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
35 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45–46 (citations omitted).
36 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 27 (citations omitted).
37 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15; H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, 8–9.
38 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15.
30
31
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the only activity which will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of
testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a
generic substitute. The patent holder retains the right to exclude others
from the major commercial marketplace during the life of the patent. Thus,
the nature of the interference with the rights of the patent holder is not
substantial. . . . [Moreover,] the Committee accepted the public policy
rationale of our sister Committee on Energy and Commerce. They reasoned
that without Section 202 generic manufacturers would be required to
engage in these bioequivalency tests after the expiration of the patent. This
would result in delays of about two years after the expiration of the patent
before a generic could go on the market. Thus, the Committee on Energy
and Commerce reasoned that Section 202 of the bill was essential to
implement the policy objective of getting safe and effective generic
substitutes on the market as quickly as possible after the expiration of the
patent.39
The above quotation highlights the third general statement worth making with
respect to the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act, i.e., that the statutory
exemption provided under § 271(e)(1) was intended to have only a limited impact on
the rights of patent holders. Comments expressing this view were made in response
to objections that the proposed safe harbor statute, which deprived a patent holder of
its intellectual property rights under certain circumstances, constituted a “taking”
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. 40
In addition to the above statement that “the nature of the interference with the
rights of the patent holder is not substantial,” 41 the Committee on the Judiciary
argued that “the generic manufacturer is not permitted to market the patented drug
during the life of the patent; all that the generic can do is test the drug for purposes
of submitting data to the FDA for approval. Thus, the nature of the interference is de
minimus [sic].”42
Admittedly, many of the criticisms leveled at the reliance on legislative history
in statutory interpretation43 apply to a reliance on the House reports on the HatchWaxman Act. The House reports expressed the views of select committee members of
a single house of Congress. They were not voted on and may not have been read by a
majority by the House of Representatives. The only language that was approved by
both houses of Congress and signed by the President in accordance with the
requirements of the Constitution was the wording that appeared in § 271(e)(1), the
enacted statute. 44 As will be discussed in Part II below, the statutory text of
§ 271(e)(1) can bear a considerably broader meaning than that reflected in the
legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that a
review of the legislative history yields little support for the broad reading of the safe
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 8–9 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 8.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 30.
43 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 369–90 (2012).
44 See generally Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 20, at 1585.
39
40
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harbor statute endorsed by a number of federal courts, including, most significantly,
the Supreme Court in Eli Lilly and Merck.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAFE HARBOR STATUTE—35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
A. Overview
One of the canons of statutory interpretation (the whole-text canon)45 holds that
to properly interpret the meaning of a statute, one must consider its entire text,
including each of its various phrases and the relationship between them. The text of
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) has been the subject of considerable debate, requiring judicial
interpretation of a number of key provisions. The acknowledged ambiguity of key
statutory phrases in § 271(e)(1) supports the view that the statute as a whole is less
than clear on its face. As Justice Scalia stated in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
“[n]o interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform § 271(e)(1) into an
elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship.”46
The fact that the judges deciding seminal safe harbor cases have adopted
different approaches to statutory interpretation adds to the uncertainty regarding
the meaning and scope of the safe harbor statute. For example, both of the Supreme
Court cases considering the scope of § 271(e)(1), Eli Lilly47 and Merck,48 were written
by Justice Scalia. An avowed textualist, 49 Justice Scalia eschewed any reliance on
the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act in construing the safe harbor as
broad in scope. 50 In contrast, Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit, who heard a
number of that court’s safe harbor cases, frequently turned to the legislative history
of the Act in arguing that the safe harbor statute should be narrowly construed, in
keeping with the intent of the drafters that § 271(e)(1) have only a de minimis impact
on the rights of patent holders.51
This Part of the Article considers the key terms of § 271(e)(1) that have been the
subject of judicial review. As will be discussed below, the meaning of certain of these
45 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 43, at 167–69; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term: Foreword: Law As Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 98
(1994).
46 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990). The Court stated, “[a]s far as the
text is concerned, therefore, we conclude that we have before us a provision [, i.e., “under a Federal
law,”] that somewhat more naturally reads as the Court of Appeals determined, but that is not
plainly comprehensible on anyone’s view.” Id. at 669; see also Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) (“[T]he contours of this provision [, i.e., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1),] are not
exact in every respect.”).
47 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 662.
48 Merck, 545 U.S. at 194.
49 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 43, at 167–69.
50 See infra Part II.B.
51 Id.; see also Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 496 F.3d 1334, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader, J.,
dissenting); Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1362–66 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Rader, J., dissenting).
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terms has emerged through either a clear statement from the Supreme Court or a
consensus among lower federal court rulings. For other terms, however, ambiguity
as to their meaning remains, leaving those who intend to use a patented invention
without authorization in reliance on the protection afforded by the safe harbor
statute with some risk of infringement liability.
B. Critical Terms
1. Under a Federal Law
The U.S. Supreme Court in Eli Lilly first addressed the applicability and scope
of the safe harbor statute.52 The Court considered whether the unauthorized use of a
medical device, an implantable cardiac defibrillator, was shielded from infringement
under § 271(e)(1). 53 The question arose from an apparent limit to the scope of
§ 271(e)(1) resulting from the words “submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”54 Where, according to this
language, is the right to use a patented invention without authorization to generate
information relating to a medical device? Unless the invention is used to develop and
submit information relating to a drug (which was not the case in Eli Lilly), its
unauthorized use does not appear to be exempted from infringement liability under
the safe harbor statute.
Writing for the Eli Lilly majority, Justice Scalia sought the answer by first
considering the meaning of the statutory term “under a Federal law.” 55 Focusing on
the relevant text of the statute, Justice Scalia argued that the words “under a
Federal law” in § 271(e)(1) refer to “an entire statutory scheme of regulation,” 56 i.e.,
an entire Act rather than a particular provision of law. In the words of the Justice,
[t]he phrase “a Federal law” can be used to refer to an isolated statutory
section . . . . The phrase is also used, however, to refer to an entire Act. The
Constitution, for example, provides that “Every Bill which shall have
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it
becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States.” And
the United States Code provides that “whenever a bill . . . becomes a law or
takes effect, it shall forthwith be received by the Archivist of the United
States from the President.” This latter usage, which is probably the more
common one, seems also the more natural in the present context. If
§ 271(e)(1) referred to “a Federal law which pertains to the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs” it might be more reasonable to think that an
individual provision was referred to. But the phrase “a Federal law which
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 663 (1990).
Id.
54 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 666 (1990).
55 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 666.
56 Id.
52
53
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regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs” more naturally summons
up the image of an entire statutory scheme of regulation. The portion of
§ 271(e)(1) that immediately precedes the words “a Federal law” likewise
seems more compatible with reference to an entire Act. It refers to “the
development and submission of information under a Federal law.” It would
be more common, if a single section rather than an entire scheme were
referred to, to speak of “the development and submission of information
pursuant to a Federal law,” or perhaps “in compliance with a Federal law.”
Taking the action “under a Federal law” suggests taking it in furtherance of
or compliance with a comprehensive scheme of regulation. Finally, and
perhaps most persuasively, the fact that [section] 202 of the 1984 Act
(which established § 271(e)(1)) used the word “law” in its broader sense is
strongly suggested by the fact that the immediately preceding—
and . . . closely related—section of the 1984 Act, when it meant to refer to a
particular provision of law rather than an entire Act, referred to “the first
permitted commercial marketing or use of the product under the provision
of law.”57
On the basis of this analysis, Justice Scalia concluded that the phrase “under a
Federal law which regulates drugs” actually means “under a provision that happens
to be included within an Act that, in any of its provisions, not necessarily the one at
issue, regulates drugs.” 58 And because the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the
“FDCA”) contains provisions that regulate drugs, as well as provisions that regulate
medical devices, patented inventions that are used to generate information relating
to medical devices are eligible for coverage under the safe harbor statute.59
Justice Scalia acknowledged that “[a]s far as the text [of § 271(e)(1)] is
concerned . . . we conclude that we have before us a provision that somewhat more
naturally reads as the Court of Appeals [and this Court have] determined, but that is
not plainly comprehensible on anyone’s view.” 60 Accordingly, he turned to the
57 Id. at 666–67 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v.
Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1683–84 (2012). The Supreme Court cited its prior Eli Lilly
decision in interpreting broadly the term “under.” Id. In the words of the Caraco Court,

[f]or example, in Eli Lilly . . . we examined a similar statutory reference to the
“submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use,
or sale of drugs.” We noted there that submitting information “under a Federal law”
suggests doing so “in furtherance of or compliance with a comprehensive scheme of
regulation.”
Id.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 668 (1990) (emphasis in original).
Id.
60 Id. at 669. The opinion continues,
58
59

one must admit that while the provision more naturally means what respondent
[Medtronic, the alleged infringer,] suggests, it is somewhat difficult to understand
why anyone would want it to mean that. Why should the touchstone of
noninfringement be whether the use is related to the development and submission
of information under a provision that happens to be included within an Act that,
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structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act, taken as a whole, for further support for his
contention that the safe harbor statute was intended to cover medical devices. As he
explained:
[T]he 1984 [Hatch-Waxman] Act was designed to respond to two unintended
distortions of the . . . patent term produced by the requirement that certain
products must receive premarket regulatory approval. First, the holder of a
patent relating to such products would as a practical matter not be able to
reap any financial rewards during the early years of the term. When an
inventor makes a potentially useful discovery, he ordinarily protects it by
applying for a patent at once. Thus, if the discovery relates to a product
that cannot be marketed without substantial testing and regulatory
approval, the “clock” on his patent term will be running even though he is
not yet able to derive any profit from the invention.
The second distortion occurred at the other end of the patent term. In
1984 . . . the Federal Circuit [in Bolar] decided that the manufacture, use,
or sale of a patented invention during the term of the patent constituted an
act of infringement . . . even if it was for the sole purpose of conducting tests
and developing information necessary to apply for regulatory
approval. . . . Since that activity could not be commenced by those who
planned to compete with the patentee until expiration of the entire patent
term, the patentee’s de facto monopoly would continue for an often
substantial period until regulatory approval was obtained. In other words,
the combined effect of the patent law and the premarket regulatory
approval requirement was to create an effective extension of the patent
term.
in any of its provisions, not necessarily the one at issue, regulates drugs? The
first response is that this was a shorthand reference to the pertinent provisions
Congress was aware of, all of which happened to be included in Acts that
regulated drugs. But since it is conceded that all those pertinent provisions were
contained within only two Acts (the FDCA and the Public Health Service Act . . . ),
that is not much of a time-saving shorthand. The only rejoinder can be that
Congress anticipated future regulatory-submission requirements that it would
want to be covered, which might not be included in the FDCA or the PHS Act but
would surely (or probably) be included in another law that regulates drugs. That
is not terribly convincing. On the other hand, this same awkwardness, in
miniature, also inheres in petitioner’s [, the patent holder, Eli Lilly’s,]
interpretation, unless one gives “under a Federal law” a meaning it simply will
not bear. That is to say, if one interprets the phrase to refer to only a single
section or even subsection of federal law, it is hard to understand why the fact that
that section or subsection happens to regulate drugs should bring within
§ 271(e)(1) other products that it also regulates; and it does not seem within the
range of permissible meaning to interpret “a Federal law” to mean only isolated
portions of a single section or subsection. The answer to this, presumably, is that
Congress would not expect two products to be dealt with in the same section or
subsection—but that also is not terribly convincing.
Id. at 668–69 (emphasis added).
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The 1984 Act sought to eliminate this distortion from both ends of the
patent period. Section 201 of the Act established a patent-term extension
for patents relating to certain products that were subject to lengthy
regulatory delays and could not be marketed prior to regulatory approval.
The eligible products were described as follows:
“(1) The term ‘product’ means: (A) A human drug product [, which means
the active ingredient of a new drug, antibiotic drug, or human biological
product]. (B) Any medical device, food additive, or color additive subject to
regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 156(f).
The distortion at the other end of the patent period was addressed by
[section] 202 of the Act. That added to the provision prohibiting patent
infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271, the paragraph at issue here, establishing
that “[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.” § 271(e)(1). This allows competitors,
prior to the expiration of a patent, to engage in otherwise infringing
activities necessary to obtain regulatory approval.61
The thrust of Justice Scalia’s argument was that a review of the structure of the
Hatch-Waxman Act indicates that the Act intended that § 156 and § 271(e)(1) work
in parallel to redress the “two unintended distortions of the . . . patent term produced
by the requirement that certain products must receive premarket approval.” 62 By
linking sections 156 and 271(e)(1), Justice Scalia was able to rely on the reference in
§ 156(f) to “any medical device” to bring the medical device under consideration in Eli
Lilly within the scope of the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor. 63
A review of the text of the Hatch-Waxman Act provided additional support for
the view that sections 156 and 271(e)(1) were intended to work in tandem. In the
words of Justice Scalia,
there are textual indications that sections 201 and 202 are meant generally
to be complementary. That explains, for example, [section] 202’s exception
for “a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are
used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4,
1913).” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Although new animal drugs and veterinary
biological products are subject to premarket regulatory licensing and
approval under the FDCA, see 21 U.S.C. §360b (new animal drugs), and the
Act of March 4, 1913, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154 (veterinary biological
products)—each “a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or
sale of drugs”—neither product was included in the patent-term extension
Id. at 669–71.
Id. at 669.
63 Id. at 670–71.
61
62
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provision of § 201. They therefore were excepted from § 202 as well.
Interpreting § 271(e)(1) as the Court of Appeals did here appears to create a
perfect “product” fit between the two sections. All of the products eligible
for a patent term extension under [section] 201 are subject to [section] 202,
since all of them—medical devices, food additives, color additives, new
drugs, antibiotic drugs, and human biological products—are subject to
premarket approval under various provisions of the FDCA . . . . And the
products subject to premarket approval under the FDCA and the Act of
March 4, 1913 that are not made eligible for a patent term extension under
[section] 201—new animal drugs and veterinary biological products—are
excluded from [section] 202 as well.64
Justice Scalia acknowledged that there may be exceptions to the “perfect
‘product’ fit” reflected in sections 156 and 271(e)(1).65 However, according to Justice
Scalia, these exceptions are rare and do not undermine the force of the argument
that as a general rule, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the “patented inventions” that
are subject to the disadvantage of the § 271(e)(1) noninfringement provision are the
ones that are eligible for the benefit of the § 156 patent term extension.66 As Justice
Scalia explained:

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 673 (1990) (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted).
65 Id.
66 See id. at 672, 674–75 nn. 4, 6. Justice Scalia opined,
64

[i]t must be acknowledged that the seemingly complete product-correlation
between [section] 201 and [section] 202 was destroyed in 1986, when, without
adding “new infant formula” to the defined products eligible for the patent-term
extension under § 156, Congress established a premarket approval requirement
for that product, and thus automatically rendered it eligible for the § 271(e)(1)
exemption from patent infringement. That subsequent enactment does not
change our view of what the statute means. That isolated indication of lack of
correlation between § 156 and § 271(e)(1) is in any event contradicted by the 1988
amendment that added most new animal drugs and veterinary biological products
to § 156 and simultaneously deleted from § 271(e)(1) the infringement exception
for those products.
Id. at 674–75, n.6 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia also stated that:
We cannot readily imagine such situations [in which the advantage of the § 156
extension is not paired with the disadvantage of the § 271(e)(1) noninfringement
provision] (and petitioner has not described any), except where there is good
enough reason for the difference. Petitioner states that disequilibrium of this sort
will often occur because the § 271(e)(1) noninfringement provision applies
“whether the patent term is extended or not,” and even with respect to “patents
which cannot qualify for a term extension.” But if the patent term is not extended
only because the patentee does not apply, he surely has no cause for complaint.
And the major reason relevant patents will not qualify for the term extension is
that they pertain to “follow-on” drug products rather than “pioneer” drug
products . . . . For these, however, the abbreviated regulatory approval procedures
established by Title I of the 1984 Act . . . eliminate substantial regulatory delay at
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Under respondent’s interpretation, there may be some relatively rare
situations in which a patentee will obtain the advantage of the § 201
extension but not suffer the disadvantage of the § 202 noninfringement
provision, and others in which he will suffer the disadvantage without the
benefit.
Under petitioner’s interpretation, however, that sort of
disequilibrium becomes the general rule for patents relating to all products
(other than drugs) named in § 201 and subject to premarket approval under
the FDCA. Not only medical devices, but also food additives and color
additives, since they are specifically named in § 201, see 35 U.S.C. § 156(f),
receive the patent-term extension; but since the specific provisions
requiring regulatory approval for them, though included in the FDCA, are
not provisions requiring regulatory approval for drugs, they are (on
petitioner’s view) not subject to the noninfringement provision of
§ 271(e)(1).
It seems most implausible to us that Congress, being
demonstrably aware of the dual distorting effects of regulatory approval
requirements in this entire area—dual distorting effects that were roughly
offsetting, the disadvantage at the beginning of the term producing a more
or less corresponding advantage at the end of the term—should choose to
address both those distortions only for drug products; and for other products
named in § 201 should enact provisions which not only leave in place an
anticompetitive restriction at the end of the monopoly term but
simultaneously expand the monopoly term itself, thereby not only failing to
eliminate but positively aggravating distortion of the [period of] patent
protection. It would take strong evidence to persuade us that this is what
Congress wrought, and there is no such evidence here.67
In sum, Justice Scalia relied on the text of § 271(e)(1) and the structure and text
of the Hatch-Waxman Act to adopt an expansive reading of the term “under a
Federal law” that brought the medical device in Eli Lilly within the ambit of the safe
harbor statute. 68 His analysis, however, left questions as to the breadth of the
statutory term “patented invention,” as will be discussed in Part II.B.4. In keeping
with his bias against the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, Justice
Scalia noted that the legislative history of section 202 of the Hatch-Waxman Act
“shed[] no clear light”69 on the issue before the Court in Eli Lilly.
2. Solely
Shortly after the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the district court of the
Northern District of California in Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation v.
the outset of the patent term and thus eliminate the justification for the § 156
extension.
Id. at 672, n.4 (citations omitted).
67 Id. at 671–73 (emphasis in original).
68 Id. at 679.
69 Id. at 669.
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Genentech, Inc. endorsed a narrow reading of § 271(e)(1), based on its interpretation
of the effect of the word “solely” in the statute. 70 According to the Scripps court, for
the exemption to apply, each allegedly infringing use must be “solely for purposes
reasonably related to meeting the reporting requirements of federal drug laws.” 71
Where an alleged infringer’s uses of the patented invention are reasonably related to
meeting the FDA requirements but are not solely related to that purpose, the benefit
of the safe harbor must be denied.72 Because the uses of the patented invention in
the Scripps case also related, among other things, to the preparation of a European
patent application and to the performance of the alleged infringer’s obligations under
an agreement, the alleged infringer’s activities were not shielded from infringement
liability under § 271(e)(1).73 As the Scripps court explained,
[T]he construction of § 271(e)(1) that Genentech [, the alleged infringer,]
urges the Court to adopt would, in effect, eliminate the express statutory
limitation “solely for” and thereby immunize any use of a patented
invention so long as some aspect of that use is reasonably related to FDA
testing. This broad construction defies the plain mandate of the statute and
the intent of Congress. The statut[ory] . . . interpretation [endorsed by this
Court, on the other hand,] accords with the intent of Congress in enacting
§ 271(e)(1). The comments of the authors of the House Report emphasize
the narrowness of the exemption.74
A number of federal courts 75 have subsequently rejected the Scripps court’s
narrow construction of § 271(e)(1) in favor of some version of the following
interpretation of the meaning of the word “solely” in the statute: Each allegedly
infringing activity (i.e., each act of manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale within the
United States, or importation into the United States, of a patented invention that
would constitute infringement but for the protection of the exemption) can have
multiple purposes, in the sense of a party’s motives or goals in undertaking such
activity, (e.g., to obtain regulatory approval in the U.S. and abroad, to obtain data to
support the filing of a patent application, to attract investors), have multiple
70

1987).

Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1396 (N.D. Cal.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. (internal citation omitted). The Scripps case is the first of a number of examples in this
Article where a judicial opinion that has construed § 271(e)(1) as narrow in scope has relied on the
legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
75 See Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d 991
F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (non-precedential); Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., No.
C-91-1413 WHO, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20004, at *18–19 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 1992); Telectronics
Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Chartex Int’l PLC v. M.D.
Personal Prods. Corp., No. 92-1556, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20560, at *13 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 1993);
NeoRx Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1994); AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron
Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029–30 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F.
Supp. 2d 104, 107–08 (D. Mass. 1998); Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Amcell Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d
197, 204 (D. Del. 2002).
71
72
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consequences (e.g., regulatory approval, issuance of a patent, a successful financing),
and be associated with non-infringing activities (e.g., use of clinical data to attract
investors or to publish scientific articles). As long as, with respect to each allegedly
infringing activity, such activity is solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products, the exemption is
available to the alleged infringer, and neither the underlying purpose(s) or attendant
consequence(s) of such activity,76 nor any associated non-infringing activities,77 will
deprive the alleged infringer of the benefit of the exemption.
76

See Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1280. The court said,
if a party were to lose the exemption every time a business purpose was
detectable in its otherwise infringing activities, the exemption would virtually
never be available and thus would fail to achieve Congress’ objective. . . . Congress
sensibly chose words in the exemption that would lead courts to focus not on
“purposes” or motives, but on “uses,” and not on collateral activities, but only on
the kinds of conduct which, absent the exemption, would constitute infringement.
In the context of this understanding, we have struggled with the question of what
analytical significance, if any, to ascribe to the “effects” of the otherwise infringing
“uses” by defendant of the patented material. Because we believe that Congress
contemplated a strictly objective test (to determine whether the exemption
attaches), and because we believe that Congress did not intend the availability of
the exemption to turn on findings about a party’s “purposes” or “motives,“ we
believe that we should consider “effects” only to the extent that doing so is helpful
in identifying what the actual uses have been, and not, obviously, to shed light on
the designs or ambitions or goals (“purposes”) that might have underlay those
uses. Moreover, since what we are examining is actual, otherwise infringing uses,
not purposes and not collateral activity, we conclude that the only kinds of
“effects” to which it might be appropriate to ascribe appreciable significance in
this analysis are those that are immediate and direct. We will concern ourselves
little, if at all, with effects that are indirect, or in which the causal chain has
several links. We will ignore altogether effects that are speculative or remote.
Thus, our inquiry is relatively straightforward. We focus only on those acts by
Ventritex [, the alleged infringer,] which would be deemed “infringing” but for
§ 271(e)(1) and in which Ventritex actually has engaged (as opposed to the acts in
which the company might engage in the future). With respect to those actual
acts, we do not ask what underlying motives might have inspired them or what
indirect, ripple effects (e.g., long range consequential benefits) they might bring.
Instead, we simply ask: are these actual uses “solely . . . reasonably related to the
development and submission of information” to the FDA. If so, the exemption
protects Ventritex. But if there are any actual, non-de minimis uses that are not
reasonably related to generating data for the FDA, the exemption will not protect
Ventritex.

Id.; see also AbTox, 122 F.3d at 1030 (“The statute . . . does not look to the underlying purposes or
attendant consequences of the activity (e.g., tests led to the sale of the patent), as long as the activity
is reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval.”); Amgen, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 107–08.
The phrase “solely for uses reasonably related” is not equivalent to the phrase
“use is solely for purposes reasonably related.” The later reflects a more
restrictive view of permissible activities under the statute. Uses, such as animal
testing, human clinical trials, or chemical composition analysis, may be related to
FDA approval, and yet be conducted for purposes other than, or in addition to,
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According to this interpretation, the word “solely” in the safe harbor statute
modifies the word “uses” and not the expressed words “reasonably related” or the
unstated words “for purposes.” 78 Moreover, the focus of the inquiry under a
obtaining FDA approval. The Federal Circuit precedents indicate that such
ulterior motives or alternate purposes do not preclude application of the
section 271(e)(1) exemption.
Id.
[T]he use [of a patented invention] must be reasonably related to (albeit not for
the exclusive purpose of) FDA approval. . . . In order to come within the protection
of section 271(e)(1), the Defendants thus must make, use, or sell the patented
invention in ways that objectively bear reasonable prospects of yielding
information that might be relevant in the FDA approval process. If the
Defendants have confined themselves to such uses, then their subsequent use of
the information gathered, their ulterior motives for engaging in the research, and
the existence of other more promising or less extensive uses that also might have
lead [sic] to FDA acceptance are all statutorily irrelevant factors.
Id. at 108.
77 See Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1278 (“[T]he exemption Congress provided is not lost simply as a
result of a showing that the defendant has engaged in non-infringing acts whose ‘uses’ fall outside
those permitted by the statute.”); Elan Transdermal, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20004, at *20 (“A party
that engages in otherwise noninfringing acts for purposes other than FDA approval does not lose the
benefits of this exemption.”).
To adopt [the patent holder’s] interpretation we would have to read into this
statute an unspoken requirement that the disclosure of information obtained
during clinical trials to persons other than FDA officials, although not itself an act
of infringement, somehow “repeals” the exemption. We do not find that
requirement in the words of the statute.
Telectronics Pacing Sys., 982 F.2d at 1524.
If Congress intended to make . . . [immediate competition following patent
expiration] more difficult, if not impossible, by preventing competitors from using,
in an admittedly non-infringing manner, the derived test data for fund raising
and other business purposes, it would have made that intent clear. The statute
contains no such provision.
Id. at 1525.
78 See Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1278. The court said,
we feel that it is significant that when Congress chose the words in which to
articulate the conditions under which the exemption would attach it did not use
the word “purposes” at all, but, instead, settled on the word “uses.“ It is plaintiff [,
the patent holder], not Congress, that has insisted that the word “purposes” is
fungible in this context with the word “uses.” We are not at all sure, however,
that Congress intended any such fungibility. The relevant phraseology is “solely
for uses reasonably related,” not “solely for purposes reasonably related.”
Obviously Congress is familiar with the word “purposes.” If Congress had wanted
courts to focus on “purposes” it probably would have selected that word instead of
the substantially more awkward word “uses” (the awkwardness is compounded in
this context, where “uses” appears earlier in the same sentence, as a verb instead
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§ 271(e)(1) analysis is only on conduct with respect to a patented invention that
would constitute an act of infringement but for the exemption.79 The word “solely” is
not superfluous in that it was added by Congress to indicate that for the exemption to
immunize an alleged infringer who uses a patented invention without authorization,
of a noun, in the listing of categories of conduct that can constitute infringement).
Given the obviousness of the alternative, we think that the selection by Congress
of the word “uses” at this critical juncture in the exemption supports two related
inferences: (1) that Congress intended the “test” for determining whether the
exemption has been lost to be “objective” rather than “subjective” (focusing on
conduct rather than motive or ultimate aim) and (2) that Congress wanted the
courts, in applying this statute, to focus on conduct (“uses”) that actually has
occurred (as opposed to uses to which a party might put its product in the future)
and that would constitute infringement but for the exemption.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Elan Transdermal, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20004, at *19 (“[The
Intermedics] court recognized that ‘solely’ in § 271(e)(1) is correctly read as modifying ‘uses,’ not
‘reasonably related.’”).
This Court determines that the Scripps case misconstrues the exemption.
Although § 271(e)(1) exempts otherwise infringing activity that is “solely for uses
reasonably related” to FDA approval, the Scripps case repeatedly refers to
“purposes reasonably related” to FDA approval. Because the Scripps court found
broader purposes than simple FDA approval behind the defendant’s action, that
court held that the exemption did not apply. The leap from “uses” to “purposes”
represents an unwarranted rewriting of the statute to limit the reach of the
exemption. As conscientiously discussed in Intermedics, Congress would have
used the term “purposes” instead of the substantially more awkward term “uses”
if that had been Congress’ intent. An alternative potential purpose is irrelevant
so long as the “use” itself is reasonably related to FDA approval.
Id. at *22–23 (emphasis in original).
79 See Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1277. The court said:
Through § 271(e)(1), Congress changed the status in law only of acts which, but
for this exemption, would constitute acts of infringement. Thus the only kinds of
acts to which this legislation applies are acts which would constitute acts of
infringement. When trying to determine whether a party is protected by this
exemption, the target of a court’s inquiry is on those acts of manufacture, use, or
sale of a patented invention that would constitute acts of infringement but for this
exemption. It is these kinds of acts, only, that must be “solely for uses reasonably
related” to generating data for submission to the FDA. It is these kinds of acts
whose “uses” are in issue, and the exemption is lost only if the court concludes
that acts of these kinds have been undertaken for “uses” that are outside those
permitted under the statute.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also NeoRx, 877 F. Supp. at 206 (“Application of Section 271(e)(1)
requires a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the activity at issue is a potentially infringing one; and (2)
whether the exemption applies to that activity.”); Amgen, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 107.
[S]ection 271 applies generally only to activities that might constitute
infringement. Thus, a defendant need not show that all of its conduct falls under
the section 271(e)(1) exemption, only the making, using, or selling of the claimed
invention.
All other conduct falls outside the section 271(a) definition of
infringement in the first instance.
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each of the allegedly infringing acts must constitute, or result in, a use of the
patented invention that is reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs or veterinary biological products (an “immunizing use”) and no other type of
use.80 In the words of the district court in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.,81 whose
thoughtful interpretation of the safe harbor statute has been endorsed by both the
Federal Circuit 82 and the Supreme Court, 83 “by enacting this exemption, congress
[sic] has said to the public: ‘You may commit acts of infringement only so long as
those acts are solely for uses reasonably related to gaining FDA approval to market
your product. If you engage in infringing activities for other uses, the exemption will
not protect you.’” 84 As noted above, the purpose(s) for such allegedly infringing acts,
the consequence(s) of such acts, and any associated non-infringing activities are
irrelevant to the analysis. In essence, this view of the meaning of § 271(e)(1) holds
that an immunizing use, in the absence of any other type of use, is necessary and
sufficient for the statutory exemption to shield an alleged infringer from
infringement liability.
The consensus among the federal court decisions that followed the Scripps
holding provides a working interpretation of the statutory term “solely” in § 271(e)(1).
Nonetheless, the term remains a source of some confusion and is still applied with a
lack of precision.85
3. Reasonably Related
The Supreme Court’s decision in Merck KGaA v. Integra, Lifesciences I, Ltd.86 is
the leading opinion on the interpretation of the statutory term “reasonably related”
See Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1277–78.
Id.
82 See Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1525, n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“For a carefully reasoned and exhaustive analysis of this point [regarding the meaning of the
statutory term “solely” and the effect of engaging in associated non-infringing conduct], arriving at
the same conclusion, see the opinion of Magistrate Wayne D. Brazil in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex,
Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D.Cal.1991).”).
83 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 207 (2005) (endorsing the
Intermedics court’s construction of the statutory term, “reasonably related”).
84 Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1277–78 (emphasis in original); see also Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d. 104, 108 n.3 (D. Mass. 1998).
80
81

The word “solely” is not rendered superfluous by the Federal Circuit’s reading [of
the meaning of the term in its precedents] . . . . Rather, it mandates that the
making, using, or selling of the patented invention cannot be for uses that are not
reasonably related to FDA approval; that is, uses which could not reasonably be
expected to lead to the production of information that could be used to satisfy FDA
reporting requirements.
Id.
85 See infra Part II.B.5 (discussing the statutory term “solely” in the majority and the
dissenting opinions in the Momenta case).
86 Merck, 545 U.S. at 202.
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in § 271(e)(1). In Merck, Integra owned a number of patents that claimed peptides
containing the amino acid sequence Arg-Gly-Asp.87 These peptides had been shown
to promote cell adhesion by interacting with certain protein receptors on the cell
surface and were, therefore, potentially useful in promoting wound healing and the
biocompatibility of prosthetic devices. 88 A scientist at Scripps Research Institute
subsequently discovered that using the patented peptides to block the same cell
surface receptors inhibited angiogenesis, the process of generating new blood vessels
that could be useful in treating a variety of diseases, including cancer. 89 Merck
entered into an agreement with Scripps to fund experiments using the patented
peptides to identify potential drug candidates that might inhibit angiogenesis. 90
Upon learning of this agreement, Integra sued Merck for patent infringement. 91
Merck responded that its activities were shielded from infringement liability under
§ 271(e)(1).92 The Federal Circuit disagreed on the basis of its narrow reading of the
scope of the safe harbor statute. 93 According to the court, “the Scripps work
sponsored by Merck was not clinical testing to supply information to the FDA, but
only general biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds.” 94 As
such, the work fell outside of the ambit of § 271(e)(1), which was intended to allow for
only a “de minimis [sic] encroachment on the rights of the patentee.” 95 The Federal
Circuit concluded its analysis by stating that the safe harbor under § 271(e)(1) “does
not reach any exploratory research that may rationally form only a predicate for
future FDA clinical tests.” 96 Merck appealed to the Supreme Court and, in its
landmark decision, the Court overruled the Federal Circuit.97 Finding for the alleged
infringer, the Court focused on the statutory term “reasonably related” in adopting a
construction of § 271(e)(1) that was considerably broader than the one endorsed by
the Federal Circuit.98
The Merck Court addressed the substantive standard to be applied in
determining whether the “reasonably related” requirement in the safe harbor statute
has been met when it reviewed the jury instruction of the district court in the case. 99
According to the district court,
[t]o prevail on this defense, [the alleged infringer] must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would be objectively reasonable for a
party in [the alleged infringer’s] situation to believe that there was a decent
prospect that the accused activities would contribute, relatively directly, to
the generation of the kinds of information that are likely to be relevant in
Id. at 197.
Id.
89 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 197 (2005).
90 Id. at 198–99.
91 Id. at 200.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 201–02.
94 Id. (citing Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
95 Integra Lifesciences I, 331 F.3d at 867.
96 Id.
97 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005).
98 Id. at 207–08.
99 Id. at 200.
87
88
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the processes by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the
product in question.100
The instruction closely tracked, and was obviously based on, a prior statement in
the Intermedics opinion:
[W]ith respect to this aspect of the test [for determining whether a “use”
qualifies as “reasonably related” under § 271(e)(1),] we should ask: would it
have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in defendant’s situation to
believe that there was a decent prospect that the “use” in question would
contribute (relatively directly) to the generation of [the] kinds of
information that was likely to be relevant in the processes by which the
FDA would decide whether to approve the product? 101
In vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanding the case, the
Supreme Court in Merck endorsed the district court’s jury instruction (and the
interpretation of the meaning of the term “reasonably related” provided by the
Intermedics court) in stating that “the evidence presented at trial has yet to be
reviewed under the standards set forth in the jury instruction, which we believe to be

Id.
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d 991 F.2d
808 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (non-precedential). The full quotation is below:
100
101

We infer that the phrase “reasonably related” (to development of information for
the FDA) as used in § 271(e)(1) reflects Congress’ acknowledgement that it will
not always be clear to parties setting out to seek FDA approval for their new
product exactly which kinds of information, and in what quantities, it will take to
win that agency’s approval. Thus, Congress used this phrase to communicate its
intention that the courts give parties some latitude in making judgments about
the nature and extent of the otherwise infringing activities they would engage in
as they sought to develop information to satisfy the FDA. Contrary to the
suggestion seemingly made by plaintiff [, the patent holder], we do not believe
that Congress intended a party to lose the exemption simply because it turns out,
after the fact, that some of that party’s otherwise infringing “uses” either failed to
generate information in which the FDA was interested or generated more
information than turned out to be necessary to secure FDA approval. Instead,
with respect to this aspect of the test we should ask: would it have been
reasonable, objectively, for a party in defendant’s situation to believe that there
was a decent prospect that the “use” in question would contribute (relatively
directly) to the generation of kinds of information that was likely to be relevant in
the processes by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the product? If
the answer is yes, it should not matter that other reasonable persons might have
concluded that FDA approval could be secured even without the information in
question.
Id. at 1280–81. “Strong textual support for the view that Congress intended the test to be objective
derives from the legislators' selection of the phrase ‘reasonably related’ to modify the word ‘uses.’
‘Reasonably related’ is language that clearly has become associated with objective standards. Id. at
1279.
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consistent with, if less detailed than, the construction of § 271(e)(1) that we adopt
today.”102
The additional detail that the Merck Court provided with respect to the meaning
of the statutory term “reasonably related” focused on the upstream activities on the
critical path of drug development that the Federal Circuit had concluded were
outside of the ambit of § 271(e)(1). In the words of Justice Scalia, writing for a
unanimous Court, “[w]e decline to read the ‘reasonable relation’ requirement so
narrowly as to render § 271(e)(1)’s stated protection of activities leading to FDA
approval for all drugs illusory. Properly construed, § 271(e)(1) leaves adequate space
for experimentation and failure on the road to regulatory approval.”103 The Merck
Court acknowledged the Federal Circuit’s view that the safe harbor “does not globally
embrace all experimental activity that at some point, however attenuated, may lead
to an FDA approval process.” 104 Nonetheless, the Court argued that if the
substantive standard for the “reasonably related” requirement is met, the generation
of information in a preclinical study is eligible for protection under § 271(e)(1),105
irrespective of whether the study (i) addresses the safety, efficacy, mechanism of
action, pharmacokinetics, or pharmacology of a drug candidate, 106 (ii) is conducted in
accordance with good laboratory practice regulations, 107 or (iii) is ever actually
included in a submission to the FDA. 108
Merck, 545 U.S. at 208.
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 207 (2005). In reaching this
conclusion, the Merck Court again relied on the reasoning set forth in the Intermedics decision. Id.
(“As a District Court has observed, ‘[I]t will not always be clear to parties setting out to seek FDA
approval for their new product exactly which kinds of information, and in what quantities, it will
take to win that agency’s approval.’”).
104 Id. at 205 (citing Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
105 Id. at 202. The Court stated,
102
103

we think it apparent from the statutory text that § 271(e)(1)’s exemption from
infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably
related to the development and submission of any information under the
FDCA. . . . This necessarily includes preclinical studies of patented compounds
that are appropriate for submission to the FDA in the regulatory process.
Id. (emphasis in original).
106 Id. at 203. The Court explained,
[the patent holder argues] that the only preclinical data of interest to the FDA is
that which pertains to the safety of the drug in humans. In [the patent holder’s]
view, preclinical studies related to a drug’s efficacy, mechanism of action,
pharmacokinetics, and pharmacology are not reasonably included in an IND or an
NDA, and are therefore outside the scope of the exemption. We do not understand
the FDA’s interest in information gathered in preclinical studies to be so
constrained.
Id.
107

Id. at 204–05. The Court stated:
[The patent holder contends] that, even accepting that the FDA is interested in
preclinical research concerning drug characteristics other than safety, the
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The Merck Court effectively broadened the Federal Circuit’s narrow
interpretation of § 271(e)(1) by extending the upstream reach of the statute. But its
holding did not clearly articulate a test to be used in distinguishing between the
research activities on the critical path of drug development that are exempted under
the statute and the discovery activities on that path that are outside of the ambit of
the exemption. A careful reading of the Supreme Court’s ruling, however, provides
some guidance as to the upstream boundary of § 271(e)(1).
According to the Merck Court,
[b]asic scientific research on a particular compound, performed without the
intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief that the compound
will cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to induce, is
surely not “reasonably related to the development and submission of
information” to the FDA.109
However,
[w]here a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that a patented
compound may work, through a particular biological process, to produce a
particular physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that, if
successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA, that
experiments in question here are necessarily disqualified because they were not
conducted in conformity with the FDA’s good laboratory practices regulations.
This argument fails for at least two reasons. First, the FDA’s requirement that
preclinical studies be conducted under “good laboratory practices” applies only to
experiments on drugs “to determine their safety,” 21 CFR § 58.3(d). . . . The good
laboratory practice regulations do not apply to preclinical studies of a drug’s
efficacy, mechanism of action, pharmacology, or pharmacokinetics. Second, FDA
regulations do not provide that even safety-related experiments not conducted in
compliance with good laboratory practices regulations are not suitable for
submission in an IND. Rather, such studies must include “a brief statement of
the reason for the noncompliance.”
Id.
108

Id. at 207. The Court noted,

[T]he use of a patented compound in experiments that are not themselves included in a
“submission of information” to the FDA does not, standing alone, render the use
infringing. The relationship of the use of a patented compound in a particular
experiment to the “development and submission of information” to the FDA does not
become more attenuated (or less reasonable) simply because the data from that
experiment are left out of the submission that is ultimately passed along to the FDA.
Id. The Supreme Court in Merck also held that § 271(e)(1) is not limited to information
relevant to the filing of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) for the approval of a
generic drug, but is sufficiently broad in scope to include information relevant to the filing of
an Investigational New Drug Application (“IND”) or a New Drug Application (“NDA”). This
aspect of the Merck Court’s holding is discussed below in Part II.B.5 (“Submission of
Information”).
109 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 205–06 (2005).
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use is “reasonably related” to the “development and submission of
information under . . . Federal law.”110
Taken together, these two statements suggest that there is a critical threshold on the
path of drug development that must be crossed before the statutory exemption from
infringement provided under § 271(e)(1) applies. Specifically,
that threshold is where “a researcher endures the unpredictable and openended process of screening untested structures and emerges with
unmistakable evidence that a particular structure shows promise . . . in
treating a particular disease through a known mechanism.” It is only after
the researcher has crossed this critical threshold that the exemption
provided under § 271(e)(1) can apply to future experiments undertaken to
study the identified drug candidate. 111
In other words, there must, at least, be a product candidate under study for the
statutory exemption to apply.112
The facts in Merck did not raise the question of whether § 271(e)(1) applies to
activities undertaken with respect to a product that has already received marketing
approval, and there remains uncertainty as to a downstream cutoff (in terms of the
stage of a product’s development) of the statutory phrase “reasonably related.” In
Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Federal
Circuit held that there is no such downstream cutoff, based, inter alia, on the Merck
Court’s statement that,
we think it apparent from the statutory text that § 271(e)(1)’s exemption
from infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions that are
reasonably related to the development and submission of any information
under the FDCA. . . . There is simply no room in the statute for excluding
certain information from the exemption on the basis of the phase of
research in which it is developed.113
While the Merck Court focused on pre-approval activities, the Court’s statement
that the exemption can extend to activities for uses that are “reasonably related to
the development and submission of any information” suggests that such activities
can take place both pre- and post-approval of a product. This view is, arguably,
inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s prior holding in Classen Immunotherapies,
Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, in which the court looked to the legislative history of the HatchWaxman Act to conclude that the safe harbor provision was not intended to apply to

Id. at 207.
See Server, supra note 17, at 51–54 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 39, Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (No. 03-1237)).
112 See id. at 45–55 (discussing the Merck case in the context of an analysis of whether
§ 271(e)(1) applies to the unauthorized use of drug discovery tools).
113 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) (emphasis in original).
110
111
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post-marketing approval activities. 114 The tension between the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Momenta and Classen is discussed in detail below.115
4. Patented Invention
In the Eli Lilly case,116 as in the Roche case117 before it and, as will be discussed
below, the AbTox 118 and Merck 119 cases after it, the alleged infringement resulted
from the investigational testing of an allegedly infringing medical product. In this
circumstance, the patented invention used without authorization and the product
candidate with respect to which the information was being generated were identical
or, at least, covered by the same patent, i.e., a patented drug or medical device was
used to study the alleged infringer’s candidate drug or medical device. The Eli Lilly
Court relied on its expansive interpretation of the meaning of the term “under a
Federal law” to argue that the statutory exemption covered the generation of
information for submission to the FDA that related to a candidate medical device. 120
However, the Court was also required to effectively argue that the statutory term
“patented invention” was sufficiently broad in scope to include the patented medical
device that was used to generate such information. 121 As discussed in this Part, the
Eli Lilly Court did so, but in a manner that left questions as to the breadth of the
term “patented invention” that were relevant to the outcome of subsequent safe
harbor cases, where the nature of the invention used without authorization had
changed (see Table 1—“Patented Invention” Cases).

Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
See infra Part II.B.5 (“Submission of Information”).
116 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 663–64 (1990).
117 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
118 AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1027–28 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
119 Merck, 545 U.S. at 195.
120 See supra Part II.B.1; Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 668–69.
121 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 672–73.
114
115
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TABLE 1
“PATENTED INVENTION” CASES

Case

Product
Candidate122

Is the
patented
invention
that was used
Patented
Invention without
authorization
Used Without
of a type that
Authorization
is eligible for
a patent term
extension?

Was the product
candidate under
study covered
by a patent that
covered the
patented
invention that
was used
without
authorization?

Does the
§ 271(e)(1) safe
harbor statute
exempt the
unauthorized
use from
infringement
liability?

123

Roche Products,
Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical
Co., Inc., 733
F.2d 858 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)
Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc.,
496 U.S. 661
(1990)

Flurazepam
Flurazepam
hydrochloride— hydrochloride
generic version 125
of the patented
sleeping pill
“Dalmane”124
Implantable
cardiac
defibrillator—
a class III
medical device129

Implantable
cardiac
defibrillator—a
class III
medical
device130

Yes
(had the HatchWaxman Act
been in effect
at the time)126

Yes127

Yes131

Yes132

Yes
(had the HatchWaxman Act
been in effect at
the time)128
Yes133

122 Note that in Classen and in Momenta the “product candidate” under study had already
received regulatory approval, however, this fact is not relevant to the analysis presented in Table 1.
123 If the answer to the question is yes, the holder of the patent on the invention used without
authorization lacks the right, based on application of the safe harbor statute, to block the
unauthorized manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale within the United States, or importation into
the United States, of its patented invention for uses reasonably related to the “development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). But the patent holder has the right to block the
commercialization of the product candidate for the life of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). In
this circumstance, the patent holder retains an opportunity to exclusively exploit the value of its
patent for commercial purposes and the impact of the safe harbor statute on the patent holder’s
right would qualify as “de minimis,” as discussed in the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman
Act. If the answer to the question is no, however, the holder of the patent on the invention used
without authorization not only lacks the right, based on application of the safe harbor statute, to
block the unauthorized manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale within the United States, or
importation into the United States, of its patented invention for uses reasonably related to the
“development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). But the patent holder may also lack the right,
under a broad construction of the statutory term “patented invention,” to derive any commercial
value from its invention if, for example, the invention is a research tool or a manufacturing test
method whose only commercially-viable use is for an activity that is shielded from infringement
liability by § 271(e)(1). In this circumstance, the safe harbor statute could render the patent holder’s
right to exclude worthless for the life of its patent.
124 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
125 Id.
126 As discussed supra in Part I, the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted after and in response to
the Federal Circuit’s Roche decision.
127 Id. at 860.
128 See supra note 126.
129 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 663 (1990).
130 Id. at 664.
131 Id.
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AbTox, Inc. v.
Exitron Corp.,
122 F.3d 1019
(Fed. Cir. 1997)

Class II medical
device used to
sterilize medical
instruments134

Merck KGaA v.
Integra
Lifesciences I,
Ltd., 545 U.S.
193 (2005)

Cyclic Arg-GlyAsp peptides
-------------------Peptidomimetics139

Proveris
Scientific Corp.
v. Innovasystems,
Inc., 536 F.3d
1256 (Fed. Cir.
2008)

Aerosol drug
delivery device
of a third
party144

No136
Class II
medical device
used to sterilize
medical
instruments135
Cyclic Arg-GlyYes
Asp peptides
-------------------- -------------------Cyclic Arg-GlyYes141
Asp peptides140

Apparatus for
characterizing
the aerosol
spray of an
aerosol drug
delivery
device145

No146

28

Yes137

Yes138

Yes

Yes

-------------------No142

-------------------Yes
(based on the
Supreme Court’s
conclusion that
the cyclic ArgGly-Asp peptides
were not used as
research tools)143
No
(based on the
Federal Circuit’s
conclusion that
the apparatus
under
consideration in
the case that was
used without
authorization
was not a
“patented
invention” for
purposes of
§ 271(e)(1))148

No147

Id.
Id. at 678.
134 AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1020–21 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
135 Id. at 1022–23.
136 Id. at 1029.
137 Id. at 1030.
138 Id.
139 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 197 (2005).
140 Id. at 200.
141 Id. at 199–200.
142 Id. at 201–02.
143 Id. at 207–08.
144 Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
145 Id. at 1260.
146 Id. at 1266.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1265–66.
132
133
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Childhood
Classen
vaccines149
Immunotherapie
s, Inc. v. Biogen
IDEC, 659 F.3d
1057 (Fed. Cir.
2011)

Momenta
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v.
Amphastar
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,
686 F.3d 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2012)

Enoxaparin—
generic version
of mixture of
polysaccharide
molecules that
prevents blood
clots154

Method for
determining
schedules for
vaccine
administration
that have lower
risks of
triggering
chronic
immunemediated
disorders150

No151

No152

Manufacturing
test method
used to
characterize
mixture of
polysaccharide
molecules155

No156

No157

29

No
(based on the
Federal Circuit’s
conclusion that
§ 271(e)(1) does
not cover postapproval
activities, where
the meaning of
the term
“patented
invention” was
not addressed in
the opinion)153
Yes
(based on the
Federal Circuit’s
conclusion that
§ 271(e)(1) does
cover postapproval
activities, where
the meaning of
the term
“patented
invention” was
addressed in the
opinion, but only
briefly and
indirectly)158

The Eli Lilly Court adopted a broad reading of the term “patented invention.” In
the words of the Court, “[t]he phrase ‘patented invention’ in § 271(e)(1) is defined to
include all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(a)
(‘When used in this title unless the context otherwise indicates . . . [t]he term
‘invention’ means invention or discovery’).”159 However, Justice Scalia’s reliance on
the “perfect ‘product’ fit” between sections 156 and 271(e)(1) reflected in the structure
and text of the Hatch-Waxman Act to bring medical devices within the ambit of the
safe harbor statute arguably placed a significant limitation on the type of “patented
invention” covered by the statute, namely, that the patented invention be eligible for
a patent term extension under § 156.160 This apparent limit presented no issue in Eli
Lilly, where the implantable cardiac defibrillator used without authorization to
develop and submit information to the FDA was a Class III medical device that
required premarket approval.161 For other types of patented inventions, however, the
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1061.
151 Id. at 1072.
152 Id. at 1069–70.
153 Id. at 1072.
154 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., 686 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
155 Id. at 1352.
156 Id. at 1357.
157 Id. at 1360.
158 Id. at 1361.
159 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990).
160 Id. at 673–74; see also supra Part II.B.1.
161 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 673–74.
149
150
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Supreme Court’s Eli Lilly decision left uncertainty as to whether such inventions
were covered by the safe harbor statute. Specifically, was the term “patented
invention” intended to include any patented invention (other than those expressly
excluded in § 271(e)(1))162 that could be employed to develop and submit information
that relates to one of the product types listed in § 156(f) under any Federal law that
includes as one of its provisions a law that regulates drugs? Alternatively, was the
term “patented invention” limited to only those patented inventions that are eligible
for a patent term extension under § 156 or, at least, to the product types listed in
§ 156(f)?
The uncertainty regarding the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term
“patented invention” was subsequently addressed by the Federal Circuit in its
decision in AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.163 In that case, the Federal Circuit relied on
the Eli Lilly holding to further broaden the scope of § 271(e)(1) to include Class II
medical devices which do not require premarket approval and whose covering patents
are not eligible for a term extension under § 156.164 In so doing, the Federal Circuit
was required to deviate from the rule of “perfect ‘product’ fit” reflected in the
symmetry between sections 156 and 271(e)(1). As Judge Rader, writing for the
AbTox court, explained:
The Supreme Court . . . interpreted the phrase “a Federal law” to refer to
“an entire statutory scheme of regulation” not merely to single sections or
subsections related to drugs or veterinary biological products. Therefore,
the Court broadly held that section 271(e)(1) applies to any use reasonably
related to regulation under the FDCA, which certainly includes Class II
devices.
The Court, however, also based its analysis on the entire statutory scheme
of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
[the Hatch-Waxman Act] . . . and found support for its interpretation in the
interplay between section 156 and section 271(e) Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at
673 . . . (“[T]here are textual indications that sections 201 and 202 [of the
1984 Act] are meant generally to be complementary.”). In other words, in
determining which products fit within the bounds of § 271(e)(1), the Court
looked to the far more explicit § 156. The Court stated:

162 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). Section 271(e)(1) specifically excludes from the term “patented
invention” any “new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily
manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes
involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques.” Id. According to one of the canons of
statutory interpretation, the explicitly excluded exceptions to the term “patented inventions” are the
only ones Congress intended, and others must not be added through judicial interpretation. See
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 45, at 99 (“Do not create exceptions in addition to those specified by
Congress.”).
163 AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
164 Id.
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. . . [Section] 271(e)(1) . . . appears to create a perfect “product” fit between
the two sections. All of the products eligible for a patent term extension
under [§ 156] are subject to [§ 271(e)(1)], since all of them . . . are subject to
premarket approval under various provisions of the FDCA . . . .
This Supreme Court reasoning creates the rub for this case. As the
Supreme Court reasoned, Class III devices are eligible for a patent term
extension under § 156, and therefore application of the § 271 infringement
shield to these devices creates a convenient statutory symmetry. Title 35
both giveth and taketh away. Class II devices, however, are not eligible for
patent term extensions. . . .
Therefore, under the broad holding of Eli Lilly, all classes of medical devices
fall within the plain meaning of section 271(e)(1). Nevertheless, under the
Court’s narrower justification of statutory symmetry, only Class III devices
fall within the section. Ultimately, this court must follow the Supreme
Court’s broader holding, which remains in force despite a potential conflict
with its own narrower reasoning. Section 271(e)(1) makes no distinctions
based upon the different FDA classes of medical devices or drugs.
Moreover, the Court explicitly accepted a statutory interpretation “in which
a patentee will obtain the advantage of the [§ 156] extension but not suffer
the disadvantage of the [§ 271(e)(1)] noninfringement provision, and others
in which he will suffer the disadvantage without the benefit.” In other
words, the Supreme Court commands that statutory symmetry is preferable
but not required. Therefore, the Supreme Court disposed of the argument,
made here by AbTox, that § 271(e)(1) is limited to Class III devices.
Section 271(e)(1) contains no such limitation.165
The Federal Circuit honored this preference for statutory symmetry in its
decision in Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.,166 although it did so in
limiting the scope of § 271(e)(1), rather than expanding the scope as the Supreme
Court had done in Eli Lilly. 167 Moreover, the Proveris court adopted the most
restrictive interpretation of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Eli Lilly in order to achieve
this result. 168 Specifically, the Federal Circuit in Proveris cited Eli Lilly for the
proposition that the term “patented invention” in § 271(e)(1) is limited to only those
products listed in § 156(f) that are eligible for a patent term extension in order to
conclude that the research tool used without authorization in Proveris is not the type
of invention that the safe harbor statute was intended to cover.169
The facts in Proveris are as follows. Proveris held a patent that covered a
system and apparatus for the calibration of the aerosol spray characteristics of

Id. at 1028–29 (internal citations omitted).
Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
167 Id. at 1258–59.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 1265–66.
165
166

[13:1 2013]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

32

medical devices that deliver aerosol-based drugs.170 Innova, the alleged infringer,
manufactured an optical spray analyzer (“OSA”) that the district court concluded was
covered by claims in the Proveris patent.171 Innova offered for sale and sold the OSA
to third party manufacturers of aerosol drug delivery devices for use by the
manufacturers in developing and submitting information to the FDA for pre-market
approval of their product candidates. 172 In contrast to the drug delivery devices
characterized by the OSA, the invention claimed in the Proveris patent and embodied
in Innova’s OSA did not require pre-market approval.173
In defense of Proveris’ claim that Innova’s manufacture, offer for sale, and sale
of the OSA infringed Proveris’ patent, Innova argued, inter alia, that its activities
were shielded by the safe harbor statute.174 The Proveris court provided the following
summary of the positions taken by the parties in the case:
Innova argues that it is entitled to the benefit of the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor
because it is undisputed that it has only offered to sell the OSA to
pharmaceutical companies and the FDA. Innova also states that it is
undisputed that the OSA is and was used exclusively in applications for
regulatory approval in accordance with the requirements of the
FDCA. . . . According to Innova, Congress intended to include within the
safe harbor all “patented inventions” unless specifically excluded . . . and
that the safe harbor provision should not be limited so as to exclude
research tools—assuming its OSA device is viewed as such.
Proveris responds that “[t]he patented inventions that fall within the scope
of § 271(e)(1) do not include patents on equipment that may be used in a
pharmaceutical laboratory, such as microscopes, analytical balances,
computers, and Proveris’s . . . equipment.” Proveris states that Congress
created the patent term extension for “products” in 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) when
it created the safe harbor in section 271(e)(1), doing so within the context of
providing generic drug developers with the means to compete commercially
immediately upon the expiration of a drug’s patent.
Under these
circumstances, Proveris reasons, section 271(e)(1) extends only to the
infringement of patents that claim “products” as that term is defined in
section 156(f) and to other patented inventions that are inherent to the
development of “products.” Thus, in Proveris’s view, the patents which may
be infringed with immunity, if the infringement is solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information to the FDA,
include patents on drug products, medical devices, food additives, and color

Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1260.
172 Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
173 Id. at 1258–59.
174 Id. at 1266.
170
171
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additives. According to Proveris, section 271(e)(1) does not immunize
infringement of patents on laboratory or manufacturing equipment.175
In ruling that Innova had indeed infringed the Proveris patent, the Federal
Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s Eli Lilly opinion and its interpretation of the
structure and text of the Hatch-Waxman Act.176 As the Proveris court explained:
[I]n Eli Lilly the Court spoke of its interpreting the phrase “patented
invention” in section 271(e)(1) to include all products listed in section 156(f)
as producing a “perfect ‘product’ fit” between the two provisions. The result
we reach today achieves the same kind of fit, or symmetry. Because
Proveris’s patented product [, which embodies the same patented invention
as Innova’s OSA,] is not subject to a required FDCA approval process, it is
not eligible for the benefit of the patent term extension afforded by 35
U.S.C. § 156(f). At the same time, because Innova’s OSA device also is not
subject to a required FDCA approval process, it does not need the safe
harbor protection afforded by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). . . .
Innova argues that it is entitled to the protection of section 271(e)(1)’s safe
harbor because it is offering for sale and selling a “patented invention” (the
invention claimed in the [Proveris] patent) “solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information under a Federal
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products.” Innova’s position is that its offering for sale and its
sale of the OSA device fit squarely within the statutory language because,
like the product claimed in the . . . [Proveris] patent, the OSA is used in a
way which is “reasonably related” to the “development and submission of
information” pertinent to the FDA premarket approval required for inhalerbased drug delivery devices. The problem with that argument is that it is
premised on the proposition that the device claimed in the [Proveris] patent
is, for purposes of section 271(e)(1), a “patented invention.” As we have just
seen, it is not. We therefore reject the argument . . . [and] . . . see no error in
the ruling of the district court that Innova’s marketing and sale of its OSA
device are not exempted from infringement by the safe harbor provision of
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).177

Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1265–66.
177 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Federal Circuit in Proveris acknowledged that
the products listed in § 156(f) have changed over time. However, matching changes have been made
in § 271(e)(1) to maintain the symmetry between sections 156(f) and 271(e)(1), providing
confirmation that the sections are intended to work in tandem to preserve the perfect product fit.
See id. at 1262 n.3 (“At the time Eli Lilly was decided, the products named in section 156(f) were ‘[a]
human drug product’ and ‘[a]ny medical device, food additive, or color additive subject to regulation
under the [FDCA].’”).
175
176
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The significance of the Federal Circuit’s holding in Proveris is three-fold. First,
the Proveris court adopted the narrowest reading of the Supreme Court’s Eli Lilly
decision in concluding that the term “patented invention” in § 271(e)(1) is limited to
only those products listed in § 156(f) that are eligible for a patent term extension. 178
Second, unlike the “patented invention” in Roche, Eli Lilly or AbTox, the “patented
invention” used without authorization in Proveris was not covered by the patent that
covered the product candidate under study 179 Rather, the “patented invention” in
Proveris was a research tool used to study the product candidate.180 Moreover, the
“patented invention” in Proveris was neither a type of product listed in § 156(f)
(unlike the “patented invention” in Roche, Eli Lilly or AbTox), nor eligible for a
patent term extension under § 156 (unlike the “patented invention” in Roche or Eli
Lilly). 181 Each of these distinctions between the Innova OSA and the patented
inventions in the prior cases was recognized by the Federal Circuit in Proveris,
It is to be noted that the versions of sections 271(e)(1) and 156(f) which were
before the Supreme Court in Eli Lilly in 1990 differed slightly from the current
versions of both provisions. As the Court noted in Eli Lilly, at that time, new
animal drugs and veterinary biological products were simultaneously excluded
from both provisions. 496 U.S. at 674. In contrast, sections 271(e)(1) and 156(f)
now include new animal drugs and veterinary biological products, unless they
have been “primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA,
hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic
manipulation techniques.” These slight statutory differences do not undermine
the relevance of the Court’s Eli Lilly analysis. Instead, we think the persisting
symmetry between both provisions over time further confirms the Court’s view
that sections 271(e)(1) and 156 operate in tandem.
Id. at 1263 n.4. Section 156(f) currently reads as follows:
(f) For purposes of this section: (1) The term “product” means: (A) A drug
product. (B) Any medical device, food additive, or color additive subject to
regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. (2) The term “drug
product” means the active ingredient of—(A) a new drug, antibiotic drug, or
human biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act), or (B) a new animal drug or
veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act and the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act) which is not primarily
manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology,
or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques,
including any salt or ester of the active ingredient, as a single entity or in
combination with another active ingredient.
35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012).
178 Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1265–66 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
179 See supra Table 1 (“Patented Invention” Cases).
180 Proveris, 536 F.3d at 1258. This distinction had previously been recognized by the Federal
Circuit. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“Use of an existing tool in one’s research is quite different from study of
the tool itself.”). Although Judge Newman’s comment was made in the course of her discussion of
the common law research exemption, it is also relevant to a discussion of the safe harbor statute. In
the same discussion, Judge Newman objected to the “failure to distinguish between investigation
into patented things . . . and investigation using patented things.” Id. at 878 n.6.
181 Proveris, 536 F.3d at 1263.
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although, as noted above, the Proveris court based its holding on the fact that the
OSA was not a type of product listed in § 156(f) and was not eligible for a patent term
extension.182 Finally, the holding in Proveris remains good law and is consistent with
the position that § 271(e)(1) does not cover certain categories of “patented invention,”
e.g., research tools and manufacturing test methods, in addition to those expressly
excluded in the safe harbor statute.183 However, as discussed below, there remains a
question as to whether this position is consistent with a proper reading of the
Supreme Court’s Eli Lilly holding and it is clearly inconsistent with the Federal
Circuit’s recent holding in Momenta.
Between the Federal Circuit’s decision in AbTox and its decision in Proveris, the
Supreme Court decided the Merck case.184 The relevance of the Merck case for the
purpose of this discussion is that it addressed, but ultimately did not resolve, the
question of whether research tools as a category are excluded from the statutory term
“patented invention” in § 271(e)(1). 185 In a footnote to his Merck opinion, Justice
Scalia stated the following:
The Court of Appeals . . . suggested that a limited construction of § 271(e)(1)
is necessary to avoid depriving so-called “research tools” of the complete
value of their patents. Respondents have never argued the RGD peptides
were used at Scripps as research tools, and it is apparent from the record
that they were not. . . . We therefore need not—and do not—express a view
about whether, or to what extent, § 271(e)(1) exempts from infringement
the use of “research tools” in the development of information for the
regulatory process.186
While the Supreme Court interpreted the facts in Merck in a way that allowed it
to side-step the research tool question, Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit, in that
court’s initial ruling in the Merck case187 and, again, on remand of the case from the
Supreme Court,188 provided a compelling argument for a research tool exception to
the application of the safe harbor provision. In Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck
KGaA, the Federal Circuit construed § 271(e)(1) narrowly and ruled that the
activities of the alleged infringers in the case did not fall within the ambit of the
statutory safe harbor.189 One of the arguments proffered by the appellate court was
that Integra’s patented compounds were used, among other things, as research tools
to characterize the product potential of synthetic peptide analogs. 190 Such uses,
Id. at 1266.
Id.
184 Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); see also supra Part II.B.3.
185 Merck, 545 U.S. at 205 n.7.
186 Id. at 205 n.7.
187 Integra Lifesciences I Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
188 Integra Lifesciences I Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 496 F.3d 1334, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
189 See supra Part II.B.3.
190 See Integra Lifesciences I, 331 F.3d at 872 n.4 (“The dissent asserts that Integra’s patented
RGD peptides are not research tools, ‘but simply new compositions having certain uses.’ . . . . The
dissent does not explain why one of those ‘certain uses’ cannot embrace use of an RGD peptide as a
laboratory tool to facilitate identification of a new therapeutic.”) (internal citation omitted).
182
183
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according to the Federal Circuit, raised an additional concern regarding an expansive
interpretation of the statutory safe harbor. Writing for the majority, Judge Rader
noted the dire consequence of a broad reading of § 271(e)(1) for the research tool
industry:
[E]xpansion of § 271(e)(1) to include the Scripps-Merck activities would
effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning biotechnology
tool patents. After all, patented tools often facilitate general research to
identify candidate drugs, as well as downstream safety-related experiments
on those new drugs. Because the downstream clinical testing for FDA
approval falls within the safe harbor, these patented tools would only
supply some commercial benefit to the inventor when applied to general
research. Thus, exaggerating § 271(e)(1) out of context would swallow the
whole benefit of the Patent Act for some categories of biotechnological
inventions. Needless to say, the 1984 [Hatch-Waxman] Act was meant to
reverse the effects of Roche under limited circumstances, not to deprive
entire categories of inventions of patent protection. 191
On remand of the Merck case, the Federal Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the scope of § 271(e)(1) in finding that all of the challenged actions
of the alleged infringers fell within the statutory exemption.192 The court avoided the
research tool question by noting that counsel for Integra, in a letter to the panel, had
adopted the position that Merck’s unauthorized use of Integra’s patented peptides did
not include uses as a research tool.193 In a separate opinion, however, Judge Rader
objected to the court’s reliance on the Integra counsel’s letter in refusing to address
the “research tool exception.”194 Moreover, he noted that,
Id. at 867.
Integra Lifesciences I Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 496 F.3d 1334, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
193 See id. The court noted:
191
192

Contrary to the position of our colleague in dissent, the Court’s ruling and our
application thereof casts no “large shadow” on the subject of “research tools.” On
remand to this court, the parties emphatically confirmed that research tools were
not at issue. See, e.g., Letter from Mauricio A. Flores, Counsel for Integra, to the
panel (June 13, 2006) (“Integra agrees with Merck that this is not an appropriate
case in which to make new law on the issue of whether patent claims to research
tools (however that term may be defined) are excluded from the ambit of
Section 271(e)(1). The Supreme Court has ruled that this case does not raise that
issue. Hence, its resolution is outside the Supreme Court’s mandate. Integra has
never argued, and does not now contend, that any of its claims at issue belong to a
class of patent claims outside the reach of that statutory exemption.”). There is
no “devastating impact on research tool inventions” . . . ; indeed, the issue is not
present, and the criticism inapt.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
194 See id. at 1349 (Rader, J., dissenting). Judge Rader stated:
[T]his court relies on a letter from one of the parties explaining that it does not
wish to rely on the research tool exception. This supposedly authoritative letter
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the Supreme Court [in Merck v. Integra] extended the exemption back up
the experimentation chain to include selection of particular species for FDA
approval out of a patented genus. The Supreme Court did not, however,
extend the exemption to encompass any method or process or other research
tool that might be used in a pharmaceutical laboratory.195
Judge Rader warned that “[b]y treating . . . research tools the same as drugs
potentially needing FDA clearance, this court’s opinion poses a danger to the entire
research tool industry.”196 As indicated above, Judge Rader’s concern regarding the
research tool industry clearly registered with the Federal Circuit panel that decided
Proveris.197
appeared after the oral argument before this court in an attempt to rectify
counsel’s unresponsive performance. With the patents already expired, Integra
may pursue a strategy to protect its entire multi-million-dollar verdict. If Integra
had really not wished to rely on research tool patents, then it would not have
asserted them in the first place.
Id.
195
196

Id.
Id.
A hypothetical example will help illustrate the importance of protecting research
tool patent rights. Suppose a university professor or small independent research
company invents and obtains a patent for a novel and extremely useful research
tool. This invention represents the work of a lifetime for its inventors and
perhaps most of the research budget for the university department or the small
company—perhaps millions of dollars in investment. The only use of the
invention tests other pharmaceutical compounds for effectiveness in fighting
cancer. The invention does not itself fight cancer, but instead simply identifies
the cancer fighting characteristics in other compounds. This patented invention
would, of course, be of great use to the pharmaceutical industry. It would also
benefit the public by identifying cancer treatments. The patent system of course
would wish to protect this invention and give incentives for more investment in
developing this kind of valuable research tool. Sadly today’s opinion misreads the
Supreme Court’s decision. This court reads the Supreme Court’s decision too
broadly because it includes within the exemption the [patent holder’s] . . . patents,
which are obviously research tools. This overbroad interpretation could obliterate
all value for the hypothetical invention discussed above and with it the incentives
for development of these inventions . . . . The university professor or small
company might expect a reward for the lifetime of labor and investment that
produced the research tool. The inventor might also hope to use that reward to
further his pioneer research. These benefits to the public and that inventor would
flow from the patent’s right to exclude that would produce reasonable royalties.
However, under today’s opinion, the exemption would swallow that lifetime of
labor and investment because the nature of the use itself, without any concern for
the object of the patented invention, would be the gauge upon which the
exemption would be measured. . . . In effect, any use of the hypothetical invention
would automatically translate to non-infringement based on this court’s expansive
application of 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1).

Id. at 1352–53.
197 Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Following Proveris, the Federal Circuit’s next significant decision regarding the
statutory safe harbor was in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC.198 It is
relevant to a discussion of the term “patented invention” only in the sense that the
patented invention used without authorization in Classen was not of a type that is
listed in § 156(f) and was not eligible for a patent term extension. 199 Classen’s
patented method for determining schedules for vaccine administration that have
lower risks of triggering chronic immune-mediated disorders was not a product or
product candidate like the patented invention used in Roche, Eli Lilly, AbTox, or
Merck,200 but was a research tool like the OSA in Proveris.201 The Federal Circuit in
Classen determined that the § 271(e)(1) statutory exemption was not available to
shield the alleged infringers in the case because the exemption did not cover the postmarketing approval activities under consideration.202 Accordingly, the Classen court
was not required to, and did not, address the question of whether the statutory
exemption was also unavailable based on the fact that the research tool used without
authorization in the case was not a “patented invention” for the purpose of
§ 271(e)(1).203
The Federal Circuit’s most recent safe harbor decision in Momenta
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,204 however, did address
the “patented invention” issue, albeit indirectly. In Momenta, the patented invention
used without authorization was a manufacturing test method used to characterize a
marketed product in accordance with FDA requirements. 205 While not a research
tool, the test method was not a type of patented invention listed in § 156(f) and was
not eligible for a patent term extension. 206 In that way the manufacturing test
method in Momenta was more like the research tool in Proveris and distinct from the
product or product candidate used in Roche, Eli Lilly, AbTox, or Merck. In contrast
to the Federal Circuit’s holding in Classen, the majority in Momenta held that
§ 271(e)(1) is available to shield the alleged infringer’s activities from infringement
liability, despite the nature of the patented invention used without authorization and
the fact that the allegedly infringing activities were undertaken following marketing
approval.207

198 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see
also infra Part II.B.5.
199 See supra Table 1 (“Patented Invention” Cases).
200 Note that, as indicated in Table 1—“Patented Invention” Cases, the Merck case is
remarkable for the fact that the patented compounds used without authorization were used both to
evaluate the compounds themselves as potential products and as research tools to characterize
peptido-mimetics. See supra Table 1. The references to Merck in the footnoted-sentence and in the
following paragraph in the text are with respect to the first and not the second use of the patented
compounds.
201 Classen, 659 F.3d at 1060.
202 Classen, 659 F.3d at 1073.
203 Id.
204 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
see also.infra Part II.B.5.
205 Id. at 1351–52.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 1361.

[13:1 2013]

Application of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
Safe Harbor Provision Following Momenta

39

While the majority in Momenta spent considerable effort in distinguishing the
Federal Circuit’s prior Classen holding regarding the applicability of the safe harbor
statute in shielding post-marketing approval activities, the Momenta court largely
avoided the “patented invention” issue and the relevance of the court’s prior holding
in Proveris. 208 However, the dissent in Momenta (not surprisingly, authored by
Judge Rader, who had advocated for a research tool exception to § 271(e)(1) in the
Federal Circuit’s Merck decisions) did raise arguments that were relied on by the
Proveris majority to limit the scope of the statutory term “patented invention” in the
safe harbor provision to a type of product listed in § 156(f) that is eligible for a patent
term extension.209
While not specifically referencing the term “patented invention,” Judge Rader
cited the Supreme Court’s Eli Lilly decision210 for its reliance on the structure and
text of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its emphasis on the relationship between sections
201 and 202 of the Act, which establishes a “perfect ‘product’ fit” between § 156 (the
patent term extension statute) and § 271(e)(1) (the safe harbor statute). 211 Judge
Rader further noted that the Eli Lilly Court “rejected . . . [an] attempt to create a
‘disequilibrium’ between the two sections.” 212 However, according to Judge Rader,
the majority’s holding in Momenta ignored the need to maintain a balance between
sections 201 and 202, as intended in the Hatch-Waxman Act. 213 In the words of
Judge Rader,
[t]his court’s new interpretation in this case would apply the disadvantage
of [section] 202 to a patentee who would not be able to obtain the benefits of
[section] 201. The patentee of a manufacturing patent does not obtain the
patent extension created in [section] 201, yet this court’s new expansion of
[section] 202 would allow its competitors to infringe during the life of its
patent. The Supreme Court rejected this sort of disequilibrium. See
Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir.
2008) ( . . . hold[ing] that § 271(e)(1) does not apply to infringement of
patented product not eligible to obtain patent extension).214
In essence, Judge Rader was objecting to the fact that the Momenta majority’s
holding allowed an alleged infringer to use without authorization a patented
invention that was not eligible for a patent term extension and to continue such use
throughout the life of the patent in order to manufacture for commercial sale the
alleged infringer’s product long after that product had received marketing approval.
According to Judge Rader, such an allowance is not consistent with the purpose of

Id. at 1357–60.
Id. at 1371–72 (Rader, J., dissenting).
210 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1370–72 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 671–73 (1990)).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 1371 (Rader, J., dissenting).
213 Id.
214 Id.
208
209
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the Hatch-Waxman Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Eli Lilly, and is
incompatible with the Federal Circuits’ prior decision in Proveris.215
Judge Moore, writing for the majority in Momenta, summarily rejected Judge
Rader’s argument.216 As she explained,
the dissent suggests that we must reject any disequilibrium between
sections 201 and 202 of the Hatch-Waxman Act, that is, the safe harbor
should not be available unless a patent term extension is also available.
This is not correct. The Supreme Court in Eli Lilly noted that equilibrium
was not always achieved. We too have rejected this strict interpretation of
the safe harbor, explaining that “statutory symmetry is preferable but not
required.” Abtox, 122 F.3d at 1029 (holding that Class II medical devices,
which are not subject to a “rigorous premarket approval process” and thus
cannot receive patent term extensions, are nonetheless covered by the safe
harbor).217
In the end, uncertainty remains with respect to the types of “patented invention”
that are covered by the safe harbor statute. The Federal Circuit’s decision in
Momenta supports a conclusion that the text of the statutory exemption does not
provide any basis for the exclusion of categories of patented inventions (other than
those expressly excluded in § 271(e)(1)) such as patented research tools or
manufacturing test methods.218 The difficulty with this view is that it fails to take
into consideration Justice Scalia’s reliance in Eli Lilly on the “perfect ‘product’ fit”
between § 156 and § 271(e)(1) reflected in the structure and text of the HatchWaxman Act. 219 In particular, it ignores Justice Scalia’s admonition to avoid
interpretations of the safe harbor statute that make a disequilibrium between receipt
of the advantage of the § 156 patent term extension and the disadvantage of the
§ 271(e)(1) non-infringement provision the general rule, rather than a rare
exception. 220 Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s Momenta decision is, arguably,
Id. at 1371–72 (Rader, J., dissenting).
Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
217 Id. (internal citations omitted).
218 Id. at 1354–55.
219 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 671–73 (1990).
220 Id. The court stated,
215
216

[u]nder respondent’s interpretation, there may be some relatively rare situations
in which a patentee will obtain the advantage of the [section] 201 extension but
not suffer the disadvantage of the [section] 202 noninfringement provision, and
others in which he will suffer the disadvantage without the benefit. Under
petitioner's interpretation, however, that sort of disequilibrium becomes the
general rule for patents relating to all products (other than drugs) named in
[section] 201 and subject to premarket approval under the FDCA. Not only
medical devices, but also food additives and color additives, since they are
specifically named in [section] 201, see 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (2012), receive the
patent-term extension; but since the specific provisions requiring regulatory
approval for them, though included in the FDCA, are not provisions requiring
regulatory approval for drugs, they are (on petitioner’s view) not subject to the
noninfringement provision of § 271(e)(1). It seems most implausible to us that
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inconsistent with its holding in Proveris. Absent clarification from the courts or
Congress, the user without authorization of a patented research tool or a
manufacturing test method who otherwise qualifies for an exemption from
infringement under § 271(e)(1) may take comfort in the Federal Circuit’s recent
Momenta decision and the Supreme Court’s record of construing the scope of the safe
harbor statute broadly.221 Such a use, however, is not without some risk.
As Judge Rader noted in each of his Merck opinions and in his dissenting
opinion in Momenta, an expansive reading of the statutory term “patented invention”
in § 271(e)(1) “would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees” owning
certain categories of inventions. 222 Yet the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman
Act provides no indication that the legislature intended the safe harbor statute to
have such a significant effect on the rights of the patent holder. 223 To the contrary, in
response to a claim that passage of section 202 of the Act would result in a “taking”
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment, it was emphasized
that the nature of the proposed safe harbor statute’s interference with patent rights
would be de minimis.224 Whether legislative history has a proper role in statutory

Congress, being demonstrably aware of the dual distorting effects of regulatory
approval requirements in this entire area—dual distorting effects that were
roughly offsetting, the disadvantage at the beginning of the term producing a
more or less corresponding advantage at the end of the term—should choose to
address both those distortions only for drug products; and for other products
named in [section] 201 should enact provisions which not only leave in place an
anticompetitive restriction at the end of the monopoly term but simultaneously
expand the monopoly term itself, thereby not only failing to eliminate but
positively aggravating distortion of the 17-year patent protection. It would take
strong evidence to persuade us that this is what Congress wrought, and there is
no such evidence here.
Id. (emphasis in original).
221 Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1354–55.
222 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 496 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader, J.,
dissenting-in-part and concurring-in-part) (“By treating these research tools the same as drugs
potentially needing FDA clearance, this court’s opinion poses a danger to the entire research tool
industry.”); Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“This court’s
interpretation of § 271(e)(1) would essentially render manufacturing method patents worthless.”).
223 See supra Part I.B.2.
224 H.R. REP. NO. 98–857, pt. 2, at 30 (1984) (“[T]he generic manufacturer is not permitted to
market the patented drug during the life of the patent; all that the generic can do is test the drug for
purposes of submitting data to the FDA for approval. Thus, the nature of the interference is de
minimus [sic].”). Note that the Fifth Amendment “taking” issue was also addressed in the following
footnote to Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Eli Lilly:
Although petitioner has not challenged § 271(e)(1) on constitutional grounds, it
argues that we should adopt its construction because of the “serious constitutional
question under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . [that would arise]
if the statute is interpreted to authorize the infringing use of medical devices.”
We do not see how this consideration makes any difference. Even if the
competitive injury caused by the noninfringement provision is de minimis with
respect to most drugs, surely it is substantial with respect to some of them—so
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interpretation can be debated. What is clear, however, is that a reasonable argument
can be made, should a judge elect to make it, that the term “patented invention” in
the safe harbor statute excludes categories of inventions, such as research tools and
manufacturing test methods, in addition to those expressly excluded by the statute.
5. Submission Of Information
a. Background
The Supreme Court in Merck stated that:
[W]e think it apparent from the statutory text that § 271(e)(1)’s exemption
from infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions that are
reasonably related to the development and submission of any information
under the FDCA. . . . There is simply no room in the statute for excluding
certain information from the exemption on the basis of the phase of
research in which it is developed or the particular submission in which it
could be included.225
The Merck Court’s reference to “any information” suggests that the statutory
exemption can extend to activities undertaken to generate information for
submission to the FDA, irrespective of whether such activities take place prior to or
after the marketing approval of the product candidate or product under study. 226
This Part of the Article considers this issue in the context of a discussion of the
meaning and scope of the statutory term “submission of information.” In particular,
it focuses on the current debate among judges of the Federal Circuit with respect to
the applicability of § 271(e)(1) to information generated in the course of post-approval
activities as reflected in the arguably conflicting holdings in Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, and Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.227 The dialogue among the Federal Circuit judges
who decided these two cases is noteworthy not only for the analysis of the term
“submission of information,” but also because it highlights the judges’ differing views
regarding the role of legislative history in statutory interpretation.
The Merck Court focused its analysis on information generated through
activities that take place prior to the marketing approval of a product. 228 The Court
the “serious constitutional question” (if it is that) is not avoided by petitioner’s
construction either.
Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 678 (internal citation omitted).
225 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005).
226 See id.
227 See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader,
J., dissenting).
228 Merck, 545 U.S. at 208.
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concluded that the scope of § 271(e)(1) is sufficiently broad to include pre-clinical
activities that are “reasonably related” to the development and submission of
information to the FDA, including information relating to the safety, efficacy,
mechanism of action, pharmacology, or pharmacokinetics of a drug candidate.229 The
Merck Court also concluded that the statutory exemption is not limited to preapproval activities that generate information on drugs that ultimately form the basis
of an FDA submission. 230 Such a limitation would restrict the application of
§ 271(e)(1) to activities required for the approval of a generic drug since “[o]ne can
know at the outset that a particular compound will be the subject of an eventual
application to the FDA only if the active ingredient in the drug being tested is
identical to that in a drug that has already been approved [as in the case of a generic
drug].”231 The Merck Court, however, did not read the statute so narrowly as to apply
only to the study of generics, and specifically rejected the view that the “exemption
[is] applicable only to the research relevant to filing an ANDA for approval of a
generic drug.” 232 Pre-approval activities that produce the types of information
relevant to the filing of an IND or NDA are also eligible for protection under
§ 271(e)(1).233
b. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC
In Classen, the Federal Circuit first considered the question of whether the
statutory exemption applies to information generated in the course of activities that
take place after the marketing approval of a product. 234 In that case, Classen held
patents that claimed a method for determining schedules for vaccine administration
that have lower risks of triggering chronic immune-mediated disorders in children.235
The alleged infringers used the patented methods without authorization, to evaluate
their already-approved vaccines in studies whose results were potentially reportable
229
230

Id.

See supra notes 106–111 and accompanying text.
Merck, 545 U.S. at 206. The court noted,
It does not follow . . . that § 271(e)(1)’s exemption from infringement categorically
excludes . . . experimentation on drugs that are not ultimately the subject of an
FDA submission. . . . Under certain conditions, we think the exemption is
sufficiently broad to protect the use of patented compounds in . . . [this]
situation[].

Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005).
Id.
233 Id. at 208. The court stated,
231
232

We . . . agree with the Government that the use of patented compounds in
preclinical studies is protected under § 271(e)(1) as long as there is a reasonable
basis for believing that the experiments will produce “the types of information
that are relevant to an IND or NDA.”
Id. (internal citation omitted).
234 See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
235 See id. at 1060.
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to the FDA.236 The alleged infringers defended by arguing that their activities were
protected under § 271(e)(1). 237 The majority in Classen (consisting of Judges
Newman and Rader, with the opinion for the court filed by Judge Newman) held that
§ 271(e)(1) “provides an exception to the law of infringement in order to expedite
development of information for regulatory approval of generic counterparts of
patented products. The statute does not apply to information that may be routinely
reported to the FDA, long after marketing approval has been obtained.” 238
The opinion for the majority relied on the legislative history of the HatchWaxman Act for the proposition that “the legislation concerns premarketing approval
of generic drugs.” 239 Quoting from the House Report that explained the Act, the
majority noted “that ‘the generic manufacturer is not permitted to market the
patented drug during the life of the patent; all that the generic can do is test the drug
for purposes of submitting data to the FDA for approval.’” 240 The Classen court
concluded that “the activity of which . . . [the alleged infringers in the case] are
accused by Classen cannot be stretched into this role.”241
The Federal Circuit in Classen also relied on Supreme Court case law to restrict
the scope of the safe harbor statute to pre-approval activities, noting that the Court’s
decisions in both Eli Lilly and Merck were “directed to premarketing approval of
generic counterparts before patent expiration.” 242 According to the Classen majority,
the Court in Eli Lilly limited its analysis to allegedly infringing activities necessary
to obtain regulatory approval. 243 Moreover, the Eli Lilly Court’s reliance on the
structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act in making its argument was further evidence
that the safe harbor statute addresses only premarket approval. 244 The Court in Eli
Lilly justified the inclusion of Class III medical devices within the ambit of § 271(e)(l)
by reasoning that the inclusion of a medical device that requires premarket approval
was consistent with the Act’s purpose of remedying the dual distorting effects that
result from premarket regulatory approval of products. 245 This rationale is not
applicable to the consideration of allegedly infringing activities that take place “long
after marketing approval has been obtained,” 246 as in Classen.247 The Supreme Court
in Merck, as in Eli Lilly, only considered allegedly infringing pre-approval
activities. 248 In that case, “the Court again analyzed the statutory purpose, and
explained that ‘§ 271(e)(1) leaves adequate space for experimentation and failure on
the road to regulatory approval.’”249 Since the activities of the alleged infringers in
See id. at 1069–70.
Id. at 1070.
238 Id. (emphasis added).
239 Id. at 1071.
240 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98–857, pt. 2, at 30 (1984)).
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 See id.
244 See id.
245 Id.; see also supra Part II.B.1.
246 Id. at 1070.
247 Id.
248 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005).
249 Classen, 659 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Merck, 545 U.S. at 207) (emphasis added)).
236
237
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Classen were not related to producing information that could lead to marketing
approval, the Classen court concluded that “Merck v. Integra does not provide a
§ 271(e)(1) safe harbor for these activities.”250
The Classen majority concluded its opinion regarding the scope of the safe
harbor provision by noting that “[e]xtensive precedent recites the purpose of
§ 271(e)(1) to facilitate market entry upon patent expiration. . . . There is no dispute
as to the statutory purpose, and no contrary precedent.”251 Judge Newman, writing
for the Classen majority, dismissed Judge Moore’s dissent in the case with the
following comment:
Our colleague in dissent strays from statute and precedent, in arguing that
any activity by any entity concerning any adversely patented product or
method is exempted from infringement by § 271(e)(1), provided only that
the information obtained is “reasonably related to submitting any
information under the FDCA, including information regarding postapproval uses.” Such a massive enlargement of the statutory exemption is
incorrect.252
Judge Moore filed the dissenting opinion in Classen in which she rejected the
majority’s position that the application of § 271(e)(1) is limited to pre-approval
activities.253 In the words of Judge Moore, “[t]he majority’s construction is contrary
to the plain language of the statute and Supreme Court precedent.” 254 Looking to the
statutory text, Judge Moore noted that “[n]owhere does the statute limit the safe
harbor to pre-approval uses.”255 Moreover, she relied on the language of the Supreme
Court in its Merck decision to conclude that “the safe harbor extends to all uses that
are reasonably related to submitting any information under the FDCA, including
information regarding post-approval uses.”256 Specifically, Judge Moore quoted the
Merck Court’s statement that “we think it is apparent from the statutory text that
§ 271(e)(1)’s exemption from infringement extends to all uses of patented intentions
that are reasonably related to the development and submission of any information
under the FDCA.”257 She also repeated the Merck Court’s subsequent conclusion that
“[t]here is simply no room in the statute for excluding certain information from the
exemption on the basis of the phase of research in which it is developed or the
particular submission in which it could be included.” 258 Judge Moore acknowledged
that all of the allegedly infringing activities under consideration in Merck took place
in the pre-approval phase of research, but rejected the majority’s conclusion that this
fact limited the Merck Court’s construction of the safe harbor provision to exclude
Id. at 1072.
Id.
252 Id. at 1072 n.4 (internal citations omitted).
253 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Moore, J., dissenting).
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. (emphasis in original).
257 Id. (quoting Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005)).
258 Id.
250
251
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post-approval activities.259 In her view, “the Court [in Merck] repeatedly underscored
the breadth of the statute’s text.”260
With respect to the majority’s reliance on the legislative history of the HatchWaxman Act in justifying its narrow interpretation of the safe harbor statute, Judge
Moore stated the following:
The majority cites extensively from the legislative history in an attempt to
justify its construction. But these citations miss the point entirely. There
is no dispute that § 271(e)(1) covers pre-approval studies, as the legislative
history indicates. None of the legislative history cited by the majority, nor
the cases it references, speak to the question at issue here—whether the
statute as enacted also covers post-approval activities. The question is not
whether Congress intended to protect pre-approval activity—but whether
the enacted legislation covers more than just preapproval activity. The
language Congress chose to enact and that was signed into law by the
President is plain on its face. There is no “pre-approval” limitation. The
statute includes within the safe harbor activity “solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information under a Federal
law.” This statute could have been written to indicate solely for uses
seeking federal approval or solely for pre-approval uses. It was not. The
plain language of this statutory text is broader. Any activity solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under
a Federal law is included in § 271(e)(1).261
Judge Moore ended her dissent by arguing that only certain of the unauthorized
activities of the alleged infringers in Classen were shielded from infringement
liability under § 271(e)(1). 262 “[T]he . . . participation by [the alleged infringers] in
studies evaluating risks associated with different vaccination schedules is reasonably
related to their requirement to review and report adverse information to the FDA”
and was, therefore, protected under the safe harbor statute. 263 However, the alleged
infringers also “immuniz[ed] subjects in accordance with a lower risk schedule” 264
and such activities did not fall within the statutory harbor exception. As stated by
Judge Moore,
[a]lthough [the alleged infringers] might be required to report adverse
events that occur as a result of their vaccines, they are not required by law
or regulation to perform such post-approval vaccinations in order to
generate data. . . . The general administration of drugs or vaccines is not
reasonably related to post-approval reporting requirements. For example,
while the FDA requires the reporting of post-approval adverse reactions,
259 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Moore, J., dissenting).
260 Id.
261 Id. at 1083–84.
262 Id. at 1084.
263 Id.
264 Id.
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this does not mean that all commercial uses of the vaccine are “solely for
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal law.” The fact that [the alleged infringers] would have to
report to the FDA any adverse reaction after administering a vaccine does
not mean the administration itself is noninfringing.265
c. Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
The Federal Circuit revisited the question of whether the statutory exemption
applies to information generated in the course of post-marketing approval activities
in its Momenta decision.266 The issue in that case involved the unauthorized use by
the alleged infringer Amphastar of Momenta’s patented manufacturing test method
which enabled Amphastar to manufacture for commercial sale a generic product that
competed with that of Momenta.267 In contrast to its ruling in Classen, the Federal
Circuit in Momenta held that the scope of the safe harbor provided under § 271(e)(1)
was sufficiently broad to cover post-approval activities.268
The panel majority in Momenta consisted of Judges Dyk and Moore.269 Judge
Rader filed a dissenting opinion.270 Judge Moore, who dissented in Classen, filed the
opinion for the court in Momenta. 271 In addition to addressing issues that were
specific to the facts in Momenta, Judge Moore relied on the arguments that she had
made in her Classen dissent. 272 In essence, she concluded that: (i) the relevant
language of § 271(e)(1) is clear and provides no basis for categorically excluding
information generated in the course of post-approval activities from the ambit of the
safe harbor statute; (ii) because there is no ambiguity in the relevant language of the
statute, there is no need to consider the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act;
(iii) the Supreme Court’s prior decisions in Eli Lilly and Merck regarding the scope of
§ 271(e)(1) support the broad reading of the safe harbor statute that is being adopted
by the Federal Circuit in Momenta; and (iv) while the Federal Circuit’s prior decision
in Classen is binding on the judges that comprise the Momenta panel, the holding in
Classen can be distinguished and, in fact, is consistent with the majority’s ruling in
Momenta.273
With respect to the language of the safe harbor statute, Judge Moore described
the task of the court as follows:
“[A]ll statutory construction cases . . . begin with the language of the
statute.” The “first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether
265
266

2012).

Id.
See Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1368 (Fed. Cir.

Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1355.
269 Id. at 1349.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
273 See id. at 1354, 1356–57, 1358.
267
268
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the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to
the particular dispute in the case.” If the language of the statute is
unambiguous, there is no second step: “Our inquiry must cease if the
statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent
and consistent.’” Whether the text of a statute is plain or ambiguous “is
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which
the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”274
Judge Moore focused her analysis on the statutory language “solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”275 She relied on
the text of § 271(e)(1) and the closely related infringement provision 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2) to conclude that § 271(e)(1) does not restrict the type of information
covered by the safe harbor provision to that necessary for an ANDA submission or
required by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act generally. 276 As she
explained, “Congress used more flexible and expansive language to define the scope
of § 271(e)(1) . . . [which] unambiguously applies to submissions under any federal
law, providing that the law ‘regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.’” 277
According to Judge Moore, “[a]s long as the allegedly infringing use is ‘for uses
reasonably related’ to the development and submission of that information it is not
an act of infringement, regardless of where that requirement resides in the [federal]
law [that regulates drugs].”278 A narrower interpretation of the safe harbor statute,
e.g., one that categorically excludes information developed in the course of postapproval activities, “would read words into the statute in violation of the express
language chosen by Congress.” 279 Judge Moore concluded by noting that “[s]ince
there is no ambiguity in the language used by Congress in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), our
inquiry into the scope of the safe harbor is complete. When the intent of Congress is
expressed so clearly and consistently throughout the statute, there is neither the
need nor the occasion to refer to the legislative history.”280
Judge Moore next argued, as she did in her Classen dissent, that her expansive
construction of the safe harbor statute is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent.281 In the words of Judge Moore,
[t]his analysis is not groundbreaking:
the Supreme Court came to
essentially the same conclusion [regarding the breadth of the statutory
language under consideration] in 1990. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
the Court explained that “the phrase ‘a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs’ more naturally summons up the image of

Id. at 1353–54 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1354 (quoting from 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012)) (emphasis omitted).
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
279 Id. at 1354.
280 Id. at 1355 (internal citations omitted).
281 Id. at 1355–56.
274
275
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an entire statutory scheme of regulation,” and not just a particular provision
of the law. . . .
The Court later reaffirmed this expansive view, explaining: “we think it
apparent from the statutory text that § 271(e)(1)’s exemption from
infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably
related to the development and submission of any information under the
FDCA [(Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act)].”
Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, (2005) (citing Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665–69).
Merck KGaA expressly rejected the notion that the safe harbor only applies
to information developed during a clinical trial. Instead, “the statutory text
makes clear that it provides a wide berth for the use of patented drugs in
activities related to the federal regulatory process.”
In light of the
unqualified exemption for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information, “[t]here is simply no room in the statute for
excluding certain information from the exemption on the basis of the phase
of research in which it is developed or the particular submission in which it
could be included.”282
Judge Moore also relied on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the word
“under” in the phrase “under a Federal law” to support her broad reading of the safe
harbor statute. 283
Quoting from the Supreme Court’s decision in Caraco
Pharmaceutical Laboratories., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S,284 she stated that “‘[u]nder
a federal law’ extends beyond just the ‘most barebones information’ required by the
FDA, and instead encompasses all ‘materials the FDA demands in the regulatory
process.’”285
Judge Moore acknowledged that there is a critical limitation in the application of
the statute.286 She stated that “[w]hile it is clear that the safe harbor applies to a
broad set of ‘activities related to the federal regulatory process,’ Merck KGaA, 545
U.S. at 202, there is an important limitation: the use must be ‘for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information,’ 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).”287
However, she went on to emphasize the breadth provided by this limiting language:
“Reasonably related” . . . does not mean that the use of the patented
invention must necessarily result in submission of information to the FDA:
“Congress did not limit § 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor to the development of
information for inclusion in a submission to the FDA; nor did it create an
exemption applicable only to the research relevant to filing an ANDA for
approval of a generic drug.” Instead, the Court explained that the safe
harbor “exempted from infringement all uses of patented compounds
Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 1356 (internal citation omitted).
284 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1684 (2012).
285 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
286 Id.
287 Id. (internal citation omitted).
282
283
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‘reasonably related’ to the process of developing information for submission
under any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of
drugs.” Thus, the Court explicitly rejected the notion that § 271(e)(1) was
limited “to the activities necessary to seek approval of a generic drug.” As
long as the accused infringer “has a reasonable basis for believing” that use
of the patented invention might yield information that “would be
appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA, that use is ‘reasonably
related’ to the ‘development and submission of information
under . . . Federal law.’”288
Judge Moore also relied on the Supreme Court’s Merck decision to address an
issue, specific to the facts in Momenta, regarding the statutory term “submission.” 289
The information generated by Amphastar through the unauthorized use of
Momenta’s patented manufacturing test method was not developed for actual
submission to the FDA. 290 Instead, it was retained by Amphastar for possible
inspection by the FDA at a later date, in accordance with applicable regulations
regarding the manufacture of a generic drug product for commercial sale. 291 It was
argued that the mere retention of this information by Amphastar did not qualify as a
“submission” under § 271(e)(1). 292 That argument was rejected by the Momenta
majority, however, which cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Merck.293 As stated
by Judge Moore,
[w]e think that the requirement to maintain records for FDA inspection
satisfies the requirement that the uses be reasonably related to the
development and submission of information to the FDA. It is not disputed
by the parties that these records are produced in order to develop and
submit to the FDA proof that the Amphastar products comply with a
Federal law. The fact that the FDA does not in most cases actually inspect
the records does not change the fact that they are for the “development and
submission of information under a Federal law.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); cf.
Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 207 (holding that uses which are not ultimately
included in a submission to the FDA are nonetheless exempted by the safe
harbor). Thus, we consider this information “submitted” for purposes of the
statute. We turn then to the question of whether these submissions are
within the safe harbor.
In Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., the Supreme Court held that
uses of patented inventions in preclinical research, the results of which are
not ultimately included in a submission to the FDA, are nevertheless
exempted from infringement by the safe harbor provision . . . [provided
Id. at 1356–57 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1367.
290 Id. at 1357.
291 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
292 Id.
293 Id.
288
289
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that] “there [was] a reasonable basis for believing that the experiments
[would] produce the types of information that are relevant to [a submission
under any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of
drugs].”294
Judge Moore next distinguished the Federal Circuit’s prior holding in Classen,
in which the court had ruled that the safe harbor statute did not exempt from
infringement liability the post-approval activities under consideration in that case. 295
Judge Moore acknowledged that the court’s prior Classen decision was controlling
precedent for the Momenta panel.296 She stated that “[w]e, of course, are bound by
the Classen decision unless it is overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.” 297
However, Judge Moore interpreted the Classen holding narrowly so as to allow the
Momenta court to rule that the unauthorized post-approval activities under
consideration in Momenta were, in fact, covered by an exemption provided under
§ 271(e)(1). 298 According to Judge Moore, “in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v.
Biogen IDEC, we held that § 271(e)(1) ‘does not apply to information that may be
routinely reported to the FDA, long after marketing approval has been obtained.’” 299
She focused on the word “routinely” and, arguably, conflated the concepts of
“obtaining marketing approval” and “maintaining marketing approval” in order to
distinguish the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Classen from that of the court in the
instant case. 300 The post-approval studies undertaken in Classen explored the
association between the timing of the administration of childhood vaccines and the
risk of developing immune-mediated disease.301 While these studies could generate
adverse experience data that would have to be submitted to the FDA, the studies
themselves were not undertaken to satisfy an FDA requirement. According to Judge
Moore’s interpretation of the Federal Circuit’s Classen holding, any information
generated in the course of these voluntary studies would be reported as part of a
“routine” submission to the FDA that was not covered by the safe harbor provision.302
In contrast, the testing undertaken by Amphastar in the Momenta case was
mandated by the FDA and the submission of information generated by the tests was
“necessary both to the continued approval of the ANDA and to the ability to market
the generic drug. Here, the submissions are not ‘routine submissions’ to the FDA, but
instead are submissions that are required to maintain FDA approval.”303 As Judge
Moore explained,

Id. (citing Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005)).
See id. at 1358.
296 Id.
297 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
298 Id. at 1358.
299 Id. at 1357.
300 See id.
301 See id. at 1358.
302 See id.
303 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(emphasis added).
294
295

[13:1 2013]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

52

[t]he submissions to the FDA in this case are anything but “routine”—they
implicate Amphastar’s very ability to continue its FDA approval for its
ANDA and to continue manufacturing and marketing [its generic version of
the drug] enoxaparin under its ANDA. We also note that, unlike in Classen
where the patented studies performed were not mandated by the FDA, the
information here is not generated voluntarily by the manufacturer but is
generated by FDA requirements the manufacturer is obligated under
penalty of law to follow. Under such circumstances, the information can be
said to have been gathered solely for submission to the FDA and not, as in
Classen, primarily for non-FDA purposes.304
Judge Moore specifically rejected the argument made by Momenta (and
endorsed by Judge Rader in his dissenting opinion in Momenta) that the Classen
holding cannot be so narrowly construed in that the Federal Circuit in that case drew
a sharp line between pre-approval activities, which can be shielded under the safe
harbor provision, and post-approval activities, which cannot be so shielded. 305 In the
words of Judge Moore, “[w]hile Momenta urges us to adopt the pre-/post-approval
distinction used by the district court, we cannot: Classen did not turn on this
artificial distinction, and the plain language of the statute is not restricted to preapproval activities.”306 She concluded this portion of her opinion as follows:
Under a proper construction of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), the fact that
Amphastar’s testing is carried out to “satisfy the FDA’s requirements”
means it falls within the scope of the safe harbor, even though the activity
is carried out after approval. Unlike Classen, where the allegedly infringing
activity “may” have eventually led to an FDA submission, there is no

304 Id.
Note that Judge Moore’s use of the words “primarily” and “purposes” in the last
sentence of this excerpt is an example of the imprecision that often characterizes a discussion of the
statutory term “solely.” Id. As noted supra in Part II.B.2 (“Solely”), an alleged infringer whose
activity is otherwise shielded from infringement liability under § 271(e)(1) loses that protection if
such activity is also for a use that is not an “immunizing use.” See supra Part II.B.2. However, the
underlying purpose or intent of the alleged infringer is irrelevant to a safe harbor analysis, and the
statutory exemption is not lost if information generated through the unauthorized use of a patented
invention is used in the conduct of non-infringing activities. Later in her Momenta opinion, Judge
Moore endorsed aspects of this interpretation of the term “solely” in § 271(e)(1) when she stated
that,

We have interpreted [the] language of the safe harbor to allow alleged infringers
to use “data from tests for more than FDA approval,” such as for fund raising and
other business purposes. Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1030 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (holding that the alleged infringer’s “intent or alternate uses [of test
data] are irrelevant to its qualification to invoke the section 271(e)(1) shield”).
Id. at 1360.
305 Id. at 1358–59.
306 Id.
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dispute in this case that Amphastar’s allegedly infringing activities are
carried out to “satisfy the FDA’s requirements.”307
Judge Moore then addressed Momenta’s argument “that even if 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1) extends to post-approval activities, Amphastar’s testing is not protected
because there are FDA endorsed non-infringing alternatives available.” 308 As she
explained, “Momenta’s interpretation is predicated upon the incorrect assumption
that ‘solely’ in the context of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) means that the patented invention
must be the ‘sole’ means of providing the information for the safe harbor to apply.”309
The Momenta majority rejected this argument, however, in stating that,
[t]he safe harbor . . . does not mandate the use of a noninfringing
alternative when one exists. The only limitation in the safe harbor is that
the use must be “reasonably related to the development and submission of
information” pursuant to a federal law regulating the “manufacture, use, or
sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.” The safe harbor’s protection
is not limited to the dire situation where the patented invention is the only
way to develop and submit the information. Instead, the safe harbor
expressly allows the submitter the freedom to use an otherwise patented
means to develop the necessary information demanded by the “Federal
law.”310
With respect to Momenta’s interpretation of the word “solely,” Judge Moore
stated that,
[t]his is not the language of the statute: under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), as long
as the use is “reasonably related to the development and submission of
information” under a relevant statute, it is not an act of infringement.
“Solely” modifies “uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information,” but does not place any other restriction on when
the patented invention may be used without infringing. As long as the use
of the patented invention is done to generate information that will be
submitted pursuant to a relevant federal law, that use falls within the safe
harbor. Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 205–06. Momenta is therefore incorrect
that the possibility that the FDA would accept the use of other, nonpatented, testing methods for the development and submission of
information precludes Amphastar from relying on the safe harbor in this
case.311
Moreover, Judge Moore noted that “[e]ven if Momenta’s strained reading of the
statute was supportable, Amphastar’s allegedly infringing activities are clearly
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1360.
309 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
310 Id.
311 Id. at 1359–60 (internal citations omitted).
307
308
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carried out according to the dictates of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.” 312
Based on her interpretation of the FDA’s testing requirements with respect to the
generic product at issue in Momenta, Amphastar was obligated to undertake testing
in accordance with the methods articulated in the official compendium (in this case
the USP) in order to demonstrate that its product was not adulterated.313 She agreed
with the interpretation of the district court in the case that any such testing fell
within the scope of the Momenta patent, undermining any argument that alternative
non-infringing test methods were available to Amphastar. 314
Judge Moore concluded her opinion for the majority in Momenta by rejecting an
argument made by Judge Rader in his dissent based on the structure of the HatchWaxman Act. 315 As discussed above, 316 Judge Rader objected to the fact that the
majority’s holding in Momenta impermissibly disrupts the intended equilibrium
between § 156 and § 271(e)(1) by applying the disadvantage of the infringement
exemption to a patentee who is unable to obtain the advantage of a patent term
extension. 317 Citing language in the Supreme Court’s Eli Lilly opinion and the
Federal Circuit’s prior decision in AbTox, Judge Moore responded that such
equilibrium is not always achieved in the application of the safe harbor statute. 318
Judge Rader, who was a part of the Classen majority, filed a vigorous dissenting
opinion in Momenta. 319 He began with the following indictment of Amphastar’s
trespass on Momenta’s patent rights and the Momenta majority’s endorsement of
such action:
Amphastar is only able to compete with Momenta by taking its patented
invention. Amphastar has not developed its own method, but instead
delights in trespassing and refuses to pay a reasonable royalty to make the
trespass lawful. This court would allow this arrogance to continue by
expanding the limited reach of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). This expansion of the
law circumvents the purpose of the law and ignores the binding precedent of
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC. Sadly this result will
render worthless manufacturing test method patents. Accordingly, I must
respectfully dissent.320
Judge Rader then crafted a dissenting opinion which, in summary, relied on the
following arguments: (i) the text of § 271(e)(1) is not plainly comprehensible and,
accordingly, one must look to the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act (which
focuses on pre-approval activities) for the purpose of the text; (ii) a proper reading of
the word “solely” in the text of § 271(e)(1) indicates that Amphastar’s infringing
activities do not fall within the protection of the safe harbor statute; (iii) the plain
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1361.
314 Id.
315 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
316 See supra Part II.B.4. (“Patented Invention”).
317 Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1361.
318 Id.
319 Id. at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting).
320 Id. (internal citations omitted) (paragraphing omitted).
312
313
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meaning of the word “submission” in § 271(e)(1) does not include the mere retention
of information by Amphastar; (iv) the majority’s attempt to distinguish the Federal
Circuit’s prior Classen decision is unconvincing and reliance on the binding precedent
established in that case requires a holding that Amphastar’s post-approval
unauthorized use of Momenta’s patent is not shielded from infringement liability
under the safe harbor statute; (v) the broad reading of § 271(e)(1) by the majority
renders manufacturing method patents worthless and negates incentives and
protections under the patent act; and (vi) the narrow reading of the safe harbor
provision adopted in Classen and endorsed in this dissent is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s rulings in Eli Lilly and Merck.321
Judge Rader rejected the contention of the Momenta majority that the text of
§ 271(e)(1) is plain and unambiguous, eliminating a need to consider the legislative
history of the Hatch-Waxman Act.322 He cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Eli
Lilly to make the point that “the text alone of § 271(e)(1) can be ‘not plainly
comprehensible,’”323 but noted that “[t]he purpose of this text, which ought to inform
its application . . . is evident from the legislative history.” 324 Having justified an
examination of the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Judge Rader
proceeded to review relevant sections of the House reports, Congressional testimony
and contemporaneous commentaries discussing the purpose of the Act. 325 On the
basis of his review, he concluded that “section 202 of the Hatch-Waxman Act, enacted
as § 271(e)(1), had the sole purpose of over-ruling this court’s holding in Roche
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. In particular, § 271(e)(1) applied only in
limited situations, namely pre-approval experiments to obtain FDA approval.” 326, 327
321 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1361–76 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Rader, J., dissenting).
322 Id. at 1367.
323 Id. at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661,
669 (1990), in which Justice Scalia stated that “[a]s far as the text is concerned . . . we conclude that
we have before us a provision that . . . is not plainly comprehensible on anyone’s view.”). As noted
supra in Part II.B.1. (“Under a Federal Law”), Justice Scalia was interpreting a specific phrase in
the safe harbor statute (“a Federal law”) and concluded that the legislative history of the HatchWaxman Act “sheds no clear light” on the meaning of that phrase. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669.
324 Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting).
325 See id.
326 Id. (internal citation omitted). Judge Rader focused his analysis on the following sections of
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857 (1984):

The purpose of 271(e)(1) and (2) is to establish that experimentation with a
patented drug product, when the purpose is to prepare for commercial activity
which will begin after a valid patent expires, is not a patent infringement. Since
the Committee’s Subcommittee on Health and the Environment began
consideration of this bill, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that
this type of experimentation is infringement. In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co., the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the
experimental use of a drug product prior to the expiration date of a patent
claiming that drug product constitutes patent infringement, even though the only
purpose of the experiments is to seek FDA approval for the commercial sale of the
drug after the patent expires. It is the Committee’s view that experimental
activity does not have any adverse economic impact on the patent owner’s
exclusivity during the life of a patent, but prevention of such activity would
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Judge Rader noted the concern, expressed by the pharmaceutical industry at the
time that the Hatch-Waxman Act was under consideration, that section 202 of the
Act permitted trespass on the rights of a patent holder. 328 But, as Judge Rader
explained,
this concern dissipated with promises that § 271(e)(1) only allowed “limited
testing of drugs” See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 29 (1984):
In this case the generic manufacturer is not permitted to market the
patented drug during the life of the patent; all that the generic can do is
test the drug for purposes of submitting data to the FDA for approval.
Thus, the nature of the interference is de minimis.329
Judge Rader relied on the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act in
reaching the following conclusions:
Specifically, § 271(e)(1) won approval because it was limited in time,
quantity, and type. First, as to time, § 271(e)(1) only applies to premarketing approval. . . . Second, as to quantity and type, § 271(e)(1) only
applies to experimentation—and therefore would have limited impact on
the patentee’s exclusivity during the life of the patent. . . . In
particular, . . . [it was] clear that section 271(e)(1) would not apply to
commercial sales, i.e., the “infringing” product would not enter the market
until after the patent’s life.330
Judge Rader concluded his review of the legislative history of § 271(e)(1) with
the following compelling summation:
The authors of this section (and I hesitate to add that I was present through
this legislative process) did not imagine that § 271(e)(1) would allow
continuous, commercial infringing sales during any portion of the life of the
patent. . . . Amphastar has already obtained FDA regulatory approval, and
extend the patent owner’s commercial exclusivity beyond the patent expiration
date.
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45–46 (1984) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). The
testimony continued, “The provisions of section 202 of the bill have the net effect of reversing the
holding of the court in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.” H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt.
2, at 27 (1984).
327 Judge Rader’s conclusion that the sole purpose of § 271(e)(1) was to overrule the Federal
Circuit’s holding in Roche is not consistent with the view expressed by Justice Scalia in his Eli Lilly
decision. In the words of Justice Scalia, “[u]ndoubtedly the decision in Roche prompted the proposal
of § 202; but whether that alone accounted for its enactment is quite a different question.” Eli Lilly,
496 U.S. at 670 n.3 (emphasis in original).
328 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Rader, J., dissenting).
329 Id. at 1365 (emphasis in original).
330 Id. at 1365–66 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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today this court rewrites the law to allow Amphastar to infringe Momenta’s
patent throughout the entire life of Momenta’s patent and for the purpose of
obtaining profits on commercial sales of a product that competes with the
patentee.
Nowhere in the legislative history can this court find any suggestion that
§ 271(e)(1) would apply other than in the limited scenario of conducting de
minimis experiments pre-approval (i.e., to obtain FDA approval). Nowhere
in the legislative history can this court find a hint that an “infringer” could
continue to use its competitor’s patented method in manufacture of each
commercial batch for contemporaneous sale. Nowhere in the legislative
history can this court find any mention of the post-approval, continuous,
commercial sales allowed by this decision. Nowhere in the legislative
history can this court find any suggestion that the mere maintenance or
retention of information as part of a company’s records is considered a
submission that would trigger § 271(e)(1). In fact, this court makes no
attempt to examine the legislative history of this section at all—a very
telling silence.331
Judge Rader then returned to the text of § 271(e)(1) to consider the words
“solely” and “submission” in the context of the facts in the Momenta case to support
his position that the safe harbor statute does not shield Amphastar’s post-approval
activities from infringement liability.332 He argued that,
[t]o facilitate a post-approval, continuous, commercial use, the court
discounts the word “solely.” Indeed, throughout its opinion, the court cites
the language of the statute yet omits the word “solely.” If one properly
reads “solely” as the statute says, the result must be that Amphastar’s
activity is not within the statute. Its infringing activity is not solely for
developing and submitting information to the FDA. Instead, Amphastar
uses this method for the purpose of manufacturing a product to sell on the
market in commerce.333

331 Id. at 1366. Note that this passage from Judge Rader’s dissenting opinion in Momenta
makes reference to what the Judge considered to be a particularly egregious assault on Momenta’s
rights. Not only did Amphastar make use of Momenta’s patented manufacturing method without
providing any consideration to Momenta, but such use permitted Amphastar to commercialize a
generic product that directly competes with Momenta’s product, eroding the latter’s share in a
generic market estimated to be over one billion dollars per year. While the focus of the case before
the Momenta court was on the unauthorized use of Momenta’s patented method, rendering the
method essentially worthless, the significant impact of that use on Momenta’s share of the generic’s
market is noted throughout Judge Rader’s dissenting opinion.
332 Id. at 1367.
333 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Rader, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). Judge Rader’s use of the
word “purpose” in the last sentence of this excerpt was ill-advised in that it introduced imprecision
into his argument. As discussed supra in Part II.B.2. (“Solely”), judicial interpretations of the term
“solely” in § 271(e)(1) distinguish between the word “purpose,” which is understood to mean motive
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With respect to the word “submission,” Judge Rader stated that “the court
claims that the mere retention of records can satisfy the ‘submission’ requirement in
§ 271(e)(1). By essentially stating that ‘submission’ can mean not really submitting,
this new interpretation reads this requirement out of the statute as well.” 334 As the
Judge explained,
despite the plain meaning of “submission of information” to mean the
company actually submitting information to the FDA, the court interprets
“submission of information” to mean the mere retention of information as
part of a company’s records. . . . Maintaining or keeping a document has the
exact opposite meaning of submitting a document. In other words,
“submission” means not really submitting anything—a strange construction
of an “unambiguous” term.335
According to Judge Rader, this “strange construction” of the word “submitted”
broadens the potential reach of the safe harbor statute well beyond its intended
purpose:
This new interpretation would allow almost all activity by pharmaceutical
companies to constitute “submission” and therefore justify a free license to
trespass. The FDA can inspect records of any drug manufacturer and
seller. Thus, the drug manufacturer need only make a record, which could
potentially be inspected by the FDA, and then any activity could satisfy this
new meaning of “submission.”336
Judge Rader concluded this portion of his analysis by remarking that “a reading
of all the words in the statute and a reading of those words in light of their legislative
history shows that § 271(e)(1) only permits a limited amount of pre-approval
experiments to obtain FDA approval.”337
or goal, and the word “use.” See supra Part II.B.2. Judge Rader’s argument appears to be that
Amphastar’s unauthorized use of Momenta’s patented method in the manufacture of Amphastar’s
generic product is not simply to generate information that may be reviewed by the FDA, but also to
make product that can be marketed and sold. This additional use, according to Judge Rader,
deprives Amphastar of the benefit of the statutory exemption. The difficulty with this argument is
that Amphastar’s commercialization of its generic product does not constitute an infringement of
Momenta’s patent (since it is not a use of the patented invention). As noted supra in Part II.B.2, an
alleged infringer’s participation in associated, non-infringing activities does not deprive it of the
benefit of the statutory exemption where it is otherwise available. See supra Part II.B.2 (“Solely”).
However, Judge Rader’s argument, based on the effect of the word “solely” in § 271(e)(1) is only one
prong of his attack on Amphastar’s unauthorized use of Momenta’s patented invention, and a minor
one at that. As is clear from a review of his entire dissenting opinion, the main argument proffered
by Judge Rader in Momenta is that the unauthorized use of a patented invention to generate
information relating to a product that has already received marketing approval is outside of the
ambit of § 271(e)(1) and, accordingly, such activity lacks the “immunizing use” necessary for
application of the safe harbor statute.
334 Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1367 (Rader, J., dissenting).
335 Id.
336 Id. (internal citation omitted).
337 Id. (emphasis in original).
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Judge Rader next offered his most convincing criticism of the majority’s opinion,
namely, that the issue under consideration in Momenta had already been addressed
by the Federal Circuit in its Classen decision, in which the court had ruled that the
safe harbor provision does not apply to the generation of information in the course of
post-approval activities.338 In the words of the Judge,
[t]his court has already decided the meaning of this statute in Classen. The
Classen majority held “§ 271(e)(1) provides an exception to the law of
infringement in order to expedite development of information for regulatory
approval of generic counterparts of patented products. The statute does not
apply to information that may be routinely reported to the FDA, long after
marketing approval has been obtained.”339
Judge Rader rejected the claim by the Momenta majority that “Classen did not
turn on the pre-/post-approval distinction.”340 To the contrary, he stressed that this
distinction was central to the Federal Circuit’s holding in Classen and that the
dissent in that case, written by Judge Moore, recognized this. As Judge Rader noted,
[t]he Classen dissent stated: “The majority concludes that the district court
incorrectly interpreted the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) because, according to
the
majority,
§ 271(e)(1)
is
limited
to
pre-approval
activities. . . . Accordingly, I conclude that the safe harbor extends to all
uses that are reasonably related to submitting any information under the
FDCA, including information regarding post-approval uses.”341
Moreover, Judge Rader took issue with the Momenta majority’s contention that,
Classen merely held that § 271(e)(1) does not apply to “routine”
submissions . . . [but] “[t]his case . . . fits well within Classen because the
information submitted is necessary both to the continued approval of the
ANDA and to the ability to market the generic drug. Here, the submissions
are not ‘routine submissions’ to the FDA, but instead are submissions that
are required to maintain FDA approval.”342
According to Judge Rader,
this court in Classen did not at any point state that § 271(e)(1) applies to
information “necessary both to the continued approval of the ANDA and to
the ability to market the generic drug.” Indeed, this post-approval,
continuous, commercial use is the exact opposite of the Classen rule.
Id. at 1367–68.
Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Rader, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
340 Id. at 1368.
341 Id. at 1369 (emphasis in original).
342 Id. at 1368.
338
339
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Classen rested its holding on “premarketing approval,” “limited amount of
testing,” and “experimentation.” This decision (“post-approval studies”;
“after approval”; “not restricted to pre-approval activities”) cannot be
genuinely reconciled with Classen (“pre-marketing approval”). Instead, the
court in this decision uses the same language as the dissent in Classen.343
The clear conflict between the Federal Circuit’s prior controlling decision in
Classen and the majority’s opinion in Momenta prompted Judge Rader to argue that,
because the Momenta majority declined to follow the court’s holding in Classen, it
should at least have “request[ed] the entire court to resolve the issue en banc.”344
Judge Rader then argued that the Momenta majority’s broad reading of
§ 271(e)(1) “would essentially render manufacturing method patents worthless.” 345
Not only is Momenta deprived of any compensation for the unauthorized use of its
government-conferred intellectual property right to exclude, but such an outcome
“repeals the incentives and protections of the patent act in this area.”346 While Judge
Rader did not dwell on the constitutional ramifications of the Momenta majority’s
construction of the safe harbor statute, 347 he noted that the majority’s interpretation
“does violence”348 to federal patent law (enacted by Congress pursuant to a grant of
power under the Constitution349) and the wording of his dissent raised questions of a
“taking” of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.350
Judge Rader next argued that the Supreme Court’s holdings in Eli Lilly and
Merck support the Federal Circuit’s prior decision in Classen and do not support the
majority’s decision in Momenta.351 In the words of the Judge, “[b]oth holdings in Eli
Lilly and Merck dealt with pre-approval activity and submissions, meaning before
obtaining FDA approval.
Further, neither even suggested that the mere
maintenance or retention of information as part of a company’s records could be a
‘submission’ to the FDA.”352 As discussed above353 and in this Part’s review of the
majority’s decision in Momenta, Judge Rader cited the Supreme Court’s Eli Lilly
decision for its reliance on the balance between § 156 and § 271(e)(1), as reflected in
the structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which is destroyed by the Momenta

Id. at 1369 (internal citations omitted).
See id. As indicated infra in note 368 and accompanying text, the Federal Circuit denied
Momenta’s petition for a rehearing en banc in November of 2012.
345 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Rader, J., dissenting).
346 Id. at 1370.
347 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 43 at 247–51. Note that one of the canons of statutory
interpretation, the constitutional-doubt canon, holds that a statute should be interpreted in a way
that avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt. Id.
348 Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1370 (Rader, J., dissenting).
349 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
350 See Momenta, 686 F.3d. at 1370 (Rader, J., dissenting).
351 See Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Rader, J., dissenting).
352 Id.
353 See supra Part II.B.4 (“Patented Inventions”).
343
344
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majority’s holding. 354 He cited the Supreme Court’s Merck decision for the
proposition “that § 271(e)(1) is intended for pre-approval, experimental, limited
use.”355 Quoting from various sections of the Merck opinion, the Judge emphasized
that all of the allegedly infringing activities under consideration in that case involved
pre-approval research that was intended to generate information for submission to
the FDA. 356 According to Judge Rader, “[n]owhere does Merck suggest that postapproval, commercial, continuous infringing use would be permitted.” 357
Judge Rader then questioned the majority’s actual reliance on the Supreme
Court’s Merck decision to support its holding in Momenta. As he explained,
[t]his court relies on some text from Merck that appears superficially to
suggest an expansive interpretation of § 271(e)(1). But, read in context,
that language has another meaning entirely. This language appears to
suggest that § 271(e)(1) covers any sort of information or submission. But,
this language actually appears in the context of the issue in Merck of
whether information intended for submission to the FDA for approval
should be covered when the information was ultimately not submitted
because the drug candidate in that case lacked potential. . . . [However,]
[h]olding that preclinical research reasonably expected to generate
information for regulatory approval does not fall outside § 271(e)(1) simply
because the research fails and does not result in a regulatory
application . . . is a far cry from permitting infringement during
manufacture of a commercial product merely because the infringing act also
generates information that might someday be submitted to the FDA, long
after marketing approval is granted.358
In addition, Judge Rader continued,
[T]his court claims that “the Court explicitly rejected the notion that
§ 271(e)(1) was limited ‘to the activities necessary to seek approval of a
generic drug.’” But, it is important to understand what Merck was trying to
distinguish. Read in context, that phrase is referring to allowing § 271(e)(1)
to include pre-approval activities for a branded drug. It was not stating
that § 271(e)(1) included post-approval activities for a generic drug. In
other words, the Supreme Court was emphasizing the words “generic drug,”
not the words “necessary to seek approval.” . . . [Moreover,] [j]ust because
Merck held that § 271(e)(1) could cover pre-approval activities for not only
the ANDA but also the NDA and IND, does not mean that the mere

See Momenta, 686 F.3d at 1370.
Id. at 1373.
356 Id.
357 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
358 Id. at 1373–74 (paragraphing omitted).
354
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retention of documents as part of a company’s records could be considered a
“submission” to the FDA.359
Judge Rader concluded his interpretation of the Supreme Court’s Merck decision and
his critique of the Momenta majority’s reliance on that decision as follows:
Thus, while Merck said that as long as an activity was intended for
submission to obtain approval, then § 271(e)(1) applies even if the
information is not actually submitted (because it is difficult to predict which
drug candidates ultimately will be successful), it did not say that § 271(e)(1)
applies even if the activity was never intended to obtain approval at all. Or
if the information was not even intended for submission to the FDA. This
court’s interpretation (that the mere retention of information as part of a
company’s records can be a “submission” to the FDA) is indeed
“groundbreaking” and the Supreme Court did not “come to essentially the
same conclusion.”360
In the final section of his dissenting opinion, Judge Rader addressed what he
believed to be a common misconception with respect to U.S. patent law that,
presumably, encourages efforts such as that of the majority in Momenta to shield
infringers from liability, namely, the view that patent law does more to hinder than
to promote innovation.361 Contrary to the position taken by certain legal scholars,
Judge Rader argued that, in practice “patents have not been proven to impede more
than stimulate technological advance.”362 In the words of the Judge,
[P]atents properly remain a tool for research and experimentation because
the system encourages publication and sharing of research results.
Disclosure of how to make and use the invention is the “quid pro quo” of the
patent grant. In exchange for disclosure, the inventor receives a limited
term of exclusivity to benefit from commercialization of his invention.
Without this promise of exclusivity, researchers at corporations would be
forced to turn to secrecy as the best protection for their inventions.363
Judge Rader concluded his dissent in Momenta as follows:
Every day, Amphastar, a competitor of Momenta, is infringing Momenta’s
patent. This decision allows that trespass. Moreover, to reach that result,
this court must ignore its own prior decision in Classen and the purpose of
the statute explained in the legislative history. Sadly this decision
abrogates Momenta’s hard-achieved property right and reallocates that
Id. at 1374 (paragraphing omitted).
Id.
361 Id. 1375–76.
362 Id. at 1375.
363 Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d. 1348, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Rader, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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entitlement to its competitors—a sad day for property owners and an
undeserved victory for those who decline to invest in the expense and
difficulty of discovery and invention.364
d. Summation
The above review of the relevant case law indicates that there is considerable
uncertainty regarding the meaning and scope of the statutory term “submission of
information” in § 271(e)(1). In particular, questions remain as to what constitutes a
“submission” under the statute and whether the information generated in the course
of post-marketing approval activities falls within the ambit of § 271(e)(1). Despite
Judge Moore’s effort in her Momenta opinion to distinguish the Federal Circuit’s
prior holding in Classen, a strong argument can be made that the interpretations
provided in Classen and in Momenta of the term “submission of information” are
inconsistent. While Judge Moore’s holding in Momenta may conform to the Supreme
Court’s broad reading of § 271(e)(1) in Eli Lilly and in Merck, there is support for the
view that the Federal Circuit in Momenta should have relied on stare decisis365 to
rule against the application of the statutory exemption to post-approval activities
(based on that court’s prior holding in Classen) or, at least, requested that this issue
in the Momenta case be resolved by the Federal Circuit en banc.366 Efforts by the
parties in the two cases to clarify the situation have proven unsuccessful. In January
of this year, the Supreme Court declined to review the Federal Circuit’s Classen

Id. at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting).
With respect to the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme Court has noted that “[s]tare
decisis . . . reflects a policy judgment that ‘in most matters it is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.’’’ Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)
(quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). It
“is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual
and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tenn., 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). The Court
has expressed its reluctance to overrule decisions involving statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Ill.
Brick Co. v. Ill., 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977). The Court has acknowledged that stare decisis concerns
are “at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 828. The
failure of the majority in Momenta to rely on the Federal Circuit’s prior holding in Classen to rule
that the statutory exemption does not protect post-approval activity (or to even acknowledge the
inconsistency between its decision in Momenta and the decision in Classen) undermines the goal of
“promot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing]
reliance on judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process.” Id. at 827.
366 See Stephen L. Wasby, Why Sit En Banc? 63 HASTINGS L.J. 747, 749 (2012) (“The formal
bases [for an en banc rehearing by a U.S. court of appeals] include the three desiderata of Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) 35—conflict with circuit precedent (intracircuit conflict),
conflict with Supreme Court rulings, and presence of an issue of ‘exceptional importance’—and the
court’s rules and general orders.”) (emphasis added). It could be argued that an en banc rehearing of
the Momenta case was justified on the basis of any or all of the three elements of FED. R. APP. P. 35.
The Federal Circuit did not agree, however, and denied Momenta’s petition for a rehearing en banc
in November of 2012. See infra note 368.
364
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decision. 367 In November of 2012, the Federal Circuit denied a petition for a
rehearing of the Momenta case en banc, 368 and in June of this year the Supreme
Court declined to review the Federal Circuit’s decision in the case.369 Unless and
until the uncertainty generated by the Federal Circuit’s holdings in Classen and in
Momenta is addressed by a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court, a party that
intends to use a patented invention without authorization to generate information in
the course of post-approval activities in reliance on the protection afforded by the safe
harbor statute will have to accept some risk of infringement liability.
III. APPLICATION OF THE SAFE HARBOR STATUTE
Despite the many judicial reviews of § 271(e)(1), determining whether the
statutory exemption applies to a specific unauthorized use of a patented invention
can present a challenge. This Part of the Article provides an analytical approach to
the application of the safe harbor statute, based on currently controlling case law. It
involves answering a series of questions that highlight the critical issues raised by
the interplay of key terms in the statute, as those terms have been construed by the
courts. The approach is intended to streamline a safe harbor analysis by ordering
the questions in a way that terminates the analysis with the first no answer. The
utility of the approach is limited, however, as a result of the uncertainty that persists
as to the meaning and scope of certain key terms of the statute, i.e., “patented
invention” and “submission of information.”
The following questions should be addressed in determining whether an activity
falls within the protection of the safe harbor statute:
Question One: Does the activity under consideration involve the use of a third party’s
patented invention?
A review of the relevant case law raises a question as to the meaning and
scope of the term “patented invention” in § 271(e)(1).370 Does the term include
any patented invention, other than those specifically excluded in the statute,
that could be employed to develop and submit information that relates to one of
the product types listed in § 156(f), as suggested by the broad holding in the
Supreme Court’s Eli Lilly decision? Alternatively, is the term restricted to the
product types listed in § 156(f) or even further limited to only those patented
inventions that are eligible for a patent term extension under § 156? These
restricted interpretations of the statutory term “patented invention” find
367 See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2011),
cert. denied sub nom., GlaxoSmithKline v. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 973, 973 (Jan.
14, 2013).
368 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., No.
12-1033 (U.S. Feb. 15, 2013) (reciting that “[a] petition for rehearing en banc was denied on
November 20, 2012”).
369 See Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2854, 2854
(2013).
370 See supra Part 0 (“Patented Invention”).
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support in the Eli Lilly Court’s narrow justification for its holding, as relied on
by the Federal Circuit in its decisions in AbTox and Proveris. 371 This
uncertainty regarding the term “patented invention” is relevant to a safe harbor
analysis in that it increases the risk of relying on the statutory exemption when
using, without authorization, a patented invention such as a research tool (as in
Proveris) or a manufacturing test method (as in Momenta). Final resolution of
this issue will, almost certainly, require a definitive ruling by the Supreme
Court.
Question Two: If the answer to the first question is “yes,” does the activity under
consideration involve the making, using, offering for sale, or selling within the U.S.,
or the importation into the U.S. of the third party’s patented invention without
authorization?
As clearly articulated in Intermedics and subsequently endorsed by a
number of federal courts, 372 “the only kinds of acts to which . . . [§ 271(e)(1)]
applies are acts which would constitute acts of infringement.”373
Question Three: If the answer to the second question is “yes,” could the allegedly
infringing activity constitute, or result in, a use of the patented invention that
generates information regarding a potential (or approved) product?
Reflected in this question is the conclusion that the Supreme Court’s Merck
decision requires that there at least be a product candidate under study for the
statutory exemption to apply to an otherwise infringing activity involving the
unauthorized use of a patented invention.374 According to this view, it is only
after this critical threshold on the path of product development has been crossed
that the alleged infringer’s information-generating activities will no longer be
considered basic science research outside of the ambit of § 271(e)(1). This
question also acknowledges, with the words “or approved” in parenthesis, the
uncertainty regarding the downstream reach of the safe harbor statute resulting
from the tension between the Federal Circuit’s holdings in Classen and
Momenta. As discussed above,375 it is not clear at the moment which, if any,
allegedly infringing activities relating to an approved product are eligible for
protection under § 271(e)(1).
Question Four: If the answer to the third question is “yes,” “would it . . . [be]
reasonable, objectively, for a party in . . . [the alleged infringer’s] situation to believe
that there was a decent prospect that the ‘use’ in question would contribute (relatively
directly) to the generation of [the] kind[] . . . of information that . . . ” 376 could be
Id.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
373 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d 991 F.2d
808 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (non-precedential).
374 See supra Parts II.B.3 & II.B.5.
375 See supra Part II.B.5.
376 Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1280.
371
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submitted under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs
or veterinary biological products (an “immunizing use”)?
This question incorporates the substantive standard for the “reasonably
related” requirement in the safe harbor statute as first articulated in
Intermedics and subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court in Merck.377 It
also incorporates the view that an “immunizing use” must be identified for the
statutory exemption to apply.378 The term “under a Federal law” must be given
the expansive meaning ascribed to it by the Supreme Court in Eli Lilly, i.e.,
“under a provision that happens to be included within an Act that, in any of its
provisions, not necessarily the one at issue, regulates drugs [or veterinary
biological products].” 379 As discussed above, 380 there is a question as to the
meaning of the statutory term “submission,” based on the conflicting views
expressed by Judges Moore and Rader in their opinions in Momenta. Recall that
Judge Moore, who authored the majority opinion in Momenta, adopted a broad
reading of the term “submission” to include information that is merely retained
for possible review by a regulatory authority at a later date. 381 It remains to be
determined whether this interpretation of the term will withstand future
judicial review, if any.
Question Five: If the answer to the fourth question is “yes,” is it the case that the
allegedly infringing activity under consideration does not constitute, nor result in, any
use of the patented invention that is not an immunizing use?
This last question reflects the effect of including the word “solely” in
§ 271(e)(1).382 As noted above, (i) neither the underlying purposes for, nor the
consequences of, the allegedly infringing activity under consideration are
relevant to a determination of whether the statutory exemption is available to
the alleged infringer, and (ii) the participation in additional activities that do not
constitute infringement does not deprive the alleged infringer of the benefit of
the exemption.383
If the answer to each of the above five questions is “yes” with respect to the
activity under consideration, then it is very likely that the safe harbor statute shields
the activity from infringement liability. This statement is qualified to reflect the
uncertainty that persists with respect to the meaning and scope of key terms in
§ 271(e)(1).

See supra Part II.B.3.
See supra Part II.B.2 (“Solely”).
379 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 668 (1990) (emphasis in original); see also
supra Part II.B.1.
380 See Part II.B.5. (“Submission of Information”).
381 See Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 686 F.3d 1348,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, J., dissenting).
382 See Part II.B.2 (“Solely”).
383 Id.
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CONCLUSION
Despite the many judicial interpretations of § 271(e)(1), questions persist as to
the applicability of the statutory exemption from patent infringement. The meaning
of certain of the key terms of the statute has emerged through either a clear
statement from the Supreme Court or a consensus among lower federal court rulings.
However, ambiguity remains as to other terms, specifically “patented invention” and
“submission of information.” The tension among the Federal Circuit’s recent
holdings in Proveris, Classen, and Momenta, resulting from the recurring effort by
select Federal Circuit judges to narrow the scope of § 271(e)(1), is evidence of the
uncertainty regarding the meaning of the safe harbor statute. Unless and until this
uncertainty is addressed by a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court, those who
intend to use a patented invention without authorization in reliance on the protection
afforded by the statutory exemption must accept some risk of infringement liability.

